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1. SUMMARY. The SG petitions for cert to review CA 2's decision 
holding unconstitutional a wide range of pretrial detainment practices -------------
in the federal Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) in Manhatten. 
The SG presents two main issues for review. First, he points to a 
three-way conflict among the court below, CA 1 and CADC regarding the ---------------~ - cqrrect constitutional standard to be applied in assessing due pro--i_ cess limitations on pretrial confinement conditions. The SG contends 
~ that the "strict scrutiny" approach adopted by CA 2 below is inconsis-
i tent with prior decisions of this Court. Second, he argues that CA 2, 
in declaring specific practices unconstitutional here, failed to com-
-2-
ply with this Court's decisions acknowledging the Govt's compelling 
interest in maintaining prison security and order, and requiring de-
ference to prison officials' determinations as to how this interest 
can best be achieved. The SG points to at least one circuit conflict 
regarding the legality of the practices involved in this case. 
2. FACTS. The Manhatten MCC has as its primary purpose the housing 
of persons detained in custody prior to trial for federal criminal 
offenses; it also houses some convicted inmates awaiting transfer 
and a few inmates sentenced to serve their terms there. The MCC 
was built in 1975 and represents, in CA 2's words, "the architectural 
embodiment of the best and most progressive penological planning." 
Its design replaces traditional cellblock construction with self-
contained residential units, or "modules," which, by eliminating 
routinized movements of detainees from one activity area to another, 
were meant to "humanize staff-inmate relations and provide a more 
'homelike' atmosphere, affording inmates greater privacy and freedom 
than jails of earlier construction." Each module contains private 
rooms that open onto common areas; the common areas have recreational 
and exercise equipment, telephones, color T~s, books, food prepara-
tion and dining facilities, and visiting rooms. The floors are car-
peted and the windows have clear glass with no bars. There is a roof-
top recreational area with ba?ketball, volleyball, and handball courts , 
as well as gym equpiment. 
Just prior to the MCC's opening the number of pretrial detainees 
rose at an unprecedented rate. Despite persistent efforts, the Bureau 
of Prisons was unable to transfer enough inmates to reduce the popu-
• lation below the MCC's planned capacity. To provide sleeping space 
. / 
for these increased numbers, the MCC replaced single beds with bunk 
beds in 20% of the private rooms and installed bunk beds in the dormi-
tory rooms so as to double their capacity. At certain times a small 




these persons were moved to private rooms as soon as possible. 
Four months after the MCC opened resp filed a prose habeas 
petn in federal court, ~ allenging the alleged overcrowding and 
a vast array of other ractices as violative of his constitutional 
rights. The suit was declared a class action on behalf of all per-
sons confined, both pretrial detainees and sentenced prisoners. 
In a pair of preliminary injunctions, one opinion rendered on summary 
judgment, and a 125-page opinion rendered after trial, SDNY (Frankel, 
J) enjoined no fewer than 20 MCC administrative practices on constitu-
~ -~ 
tional and statutory grounds. 
3. OPINION BELOW AND CONTENTIONS. CA 2 began by narrowing the 
issues before it. First, it reversed the DC's order insofar as it 
was premised on a finding that the Attorney General had breached his 
statutory duty to provide "suitable" care for inmates in his custody. 
The AG's actions in this respect, CA 2 held, were "committed to agency 
discretion by law" ·and hence judicially unreviewable. Second, CA 2 
remanded the DC's findings of unconstitutional deprivations insofar 
as they related to sentenced inmates. · The court noted that the DC 
had applied the same heightened level of scrutiny to restr·ictions ~n 
convicted persons as to restrictions on pretrial detainees, and held 
that a lower level of scrutiny under the 8th Amendment was properly 
applicable to the former. Third, CA 2 held that the DC's injunctions 
against certain MCC practices intruded too far into the minutiae of 
prison administration. Judge Frankel, for example, had (1) abolished 
the MCC's policy requiring visitors to request a bathroom key from 
a correctional officer; (2) ordered the MCC to take commissary request E 
every other day rather than twice a week; (3) ordered the MCC to insta} 
23 telephones so that inmates could make long-distance calls; (4) or-
dered that inmates be permitted to possess typewriters for personal 
use; (5) found the prison attire "garish, ill-fitting, degrading and 
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humiliating to wear" and ordered the MCC to "permit pretrial detainees 
to wear their own clothes unless they volunteer to wear correctional 
uniforms." 
Although CA 2 detected some dissonances in Judge Frankel's treat-___, 
ment, however, it affirm~d his opinion in the main. Specifically, 
 :.wrr-, ,.,_,,w ,,,,,_,. ,-.._ 
it approved (a) the heightened level of constitutional scrutiny .that 
he had applied to restrictions on pretrial detainees and (b) his 
application of those standards to the practices concerned. 
(a) Constitutional Standards. CA 2 held squarely that ''strict 
scrutiny" a Because an individual is presumed innocent until 
proven guilty, pretrial detainees must be accorded as far as possible 
the same rights as unincarcerated individuals. Accordingly, it is 
not enough that the conditions of their confinement "merely comport 
with contemporary standards of decency prescribed by" the 8th Amend-
1 ment. Rather, the "indisuptable rudiments of due process" dictate 
that pretrial detainees "be subjected to only those 'restrictions and 
privations' which 'inhere in their confinement itself or which are 
justified by compelling necessities of jail administration.'" Under 
this standard of "compelling necessity," deprivation o~ detainees' , 
rights cannot be justified by "the cries of fiscal necessity," "ad-
ministrative convenience," or "the cold comfort that conditions in 
other jails are worse." 
The SG contends that CA 2, by proscribing all restrictions on 
pretrial detainees that are not justified by a "compelling necessity," 
and by eliminating fiscal and administrative constraints as possible 
justifications, has enunciated a constitutional standard more stringent 
, 
than that adopted either by CA 1 or CADC in their recent pretrial 
detainment opinions. In Fee~ey v. Sampson, 570 F2d 364 (1978) (Camp-
bell, Markey (CCPA); Coffin, dissenting), CA 1 promulgated a "reasonable 
relationship" test. ~ udge Campbell there wrote: 
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While detainees are not convicts, the same practical 
reasons that counsel judicial restraint in second-guessing 
correctional officials dictates restraint in second-guess-
ing the authorities who run jails .... We believe that the 
proper standard by which to review the actions of those 
lawfully entrusted with the custody of detainees is that 
normally employed in reviewing administrative actions: 
whether the actions of jail authorities are arbitrary or 
capricious; whether they are lacking in a reasonable re-
lati~ship to the limited purpose of the confinement; and 
wheffier they are other:-7ise not in accordance with law. 
Id.at 371. The majority expressly rejected the "strict scrutiny" 
approach taken by the DC, under ~hich "a state carries the burden of 
justifying every restriction imposed on an inmate on the basis of 
'compelling interest', and must further demonstrate that each measure 
taken is the 'least restrictive alternative'." Id. at 370. Rather, 
said the majority, due process requires only that the conditions of 
confinement bear "a reasonable relation to the state's purpose in 
confining a detainee," id. at 369; that the state play "its limited 
custodial role in a reasonable, and hence a humane, manner;' id. at 
370; and that the detainee "be treated in a manner rationally related 
to the limited purpose for which he is imprisoned." Id. Judge 
Coffin dissented, believing that a higher standard of review was ap-
propriate. 
In Campbell v. McGruder, No. 77-1350 (CADC 30 March 1978) (Bazelon , 
Leventhal; MacKinnon, dissenting), CADC enunciated a standard inter-
mediate between CA 2's "compelling neces~ity" and CA l's "reasonable 
relationship" tests. Judge Bazelon stated that pretrial detainees 
possess a "liberty interest ... rooted in the presumption of inno-
cence." Slip op at 13. Accordingly, 
each restriction of the jail regimen must be carefully 
examined to determine if it is justified by substantial 
necessities of jail administration. To evaluate these 
necessities we will look to the needs of the state to 
produce the detainee for trial, to maintain the security 
of the jail, or generally to sustain the institution of pre~ 
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trial detention at a feasible cost. 
Id. at 17 (emphasis added). The majority specifically acknowledged 
the Govt's interest in being able "to manage the institution of pre-
trial detention in an administratively feasible manner." Id. at 12. 
The majority held, however, that under certain circumstances this 
"balancing approach" must yield to a higher level of scrutiny. 
"[C]onditions of confinement that are likely to impair a detainee's 
mental or physical health," id. at 18, or which may impede a defen-
dant's preparation or presentation of his defense at trial, "are 
constitutionally suspect and can be justified only by the most com-
pelling necessity." _ Id. _at 19. Judge MacKinnon dissented, rejecting 
the majority's reliance on the presumption of innocence, diss op at 
32-33, and contending that greater deference to the judgments of prisor 
authorities was required, id. at 36-37. 
The decisions of CA 1, CADC, and CA 2 enunciate three distinct 
due process standards: a "reasonable relationship" test, a "substantial 
necessity" test allowing administrative and fiscal concerns as justifi-
cations, and a "compelling necessity" test allowing no administra-
tive or fiscal justifications to be asserted. The SG notes that GA 4 
has "adopted a standard that parallels the Second Circuit test." Petn 
at 21 n.16, citing Patterson v. Morrisette, 564 F2d 1109 (1977). 
Judge Coffin in Feeley noted that CAs 3 & 7have adopted "rational 
relationship" tests similar to CA l's. See 570 F2d at 378. The 
DC Circuit's intermediate test seems to stand alone, although the SG 
suggests rather optimistically that its test and CA l's "lev[y] 
essentially similar requirements." Petn at 19 . 
• 
After pointing out the circuit conflict, the SG argues that the 
due process standard adopted by CA 2 lacks substantial support in 
this Court's decisions. The SG initially questions the reasoning of 
both CA 2 and CADC that the "presumption of innocence" dictates a 
-7-
heightened level of scrutiny for confinement conditions imposed on 
pretrial detainees. As CA 3 recently has noted, the "presumption of 
innocence" is not a source of substantive rights; it serves rather 
[to] allocate[] the burden of proof. It is a principle of 
evidence, ... acting as the foundation for the procedural due 
process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt .... 
If the "presumption of innocence" is read literally to ap-
ply to all pretrial procedures, it is impossible to justi-
fy bail or pretrial detention, both of which are restraints 
imposed upon an accused despite the presumption. 
Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F2d 1077, 1080 n.1 (1976). 
Following the reasoning of CA 3, the SG stresses that pretrial 
confinement--notwithstanding that it is itself a fundamental depri-
vation of liberty--is implicitly authorized by the 8th Amendment and 
is justified by the governmental interest in controlling crime. The 
prisoner, moreover, is afforded a hearing prior to commitment. Once 
detention is ordered, therefore, the conditions of the detainee's 
confinement, unless they trench on specific constitutional guarantees, 
such as 1st Amendment freedoms, impinge directly only on detainees' 
"understandable desire to live comfortably during detention." This 
Court has never elevated "the individual's interest in economic com-
fort to the level of a fundamental constitutional interest." This 
Court, moreover, has consistently held that the conditions of con-
finement are shaped importantly by considerations of prison order and 
security--considerations which are "peculiarly within the province 
and professional expertise of corrections officials" to whose judgment 
courts "should ordinarily defer." Jones v. North Carolin.a Prisoners' 
Labor Union, 433 US 119, 128 (1977), quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 
US 817, 827 (1974). The SG concludes that under this Court's decisions 
the proper standard of review is as follows: 
---- --- - - ~-- --
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[I]n reviewing practices of detention for pretrial detainees 
under the Due Process Clause, unless a practice abridges a 
specific, fundamental right guaranteed by other provisions 
of the Constitution, the practice should be upheld if it 
is reasonably related to the objective of confinement and 
the inherent needs of the institution for security, order 
and safety. Furthermore, in determining whether living 
conditions during confinement are decent and reasonable, 
consideration should be given to cost, administrative 
feasibility, and available practical alternatives. 
Resp seems to concede that·the constitutional standards announced 
by CAs DC, 1 & 2 are mutually inconsistent. Whereas the SG says that 
CAOC's test is "essentially similar" to CA l's, however, resp 
thinks it "articulates the same substantive principle" as CA 2's. 
Resp contends in any event that this case is "an inappropriate ve-
hicle for meaningful resolution" of the differences among the cir-
cuits, since the practices held illegal below would be invalidated 
regardless of which standard of review were applied. Resp agrees with 
the SG that this Court's cases compel deference to the opinions of 
correctional officials; resp contends, however, that the record and 
decisions below indicate that great "attention, consideration, and 
deference" were accorded the views of prison officials here. 
(b) ._ Application of the standard to the practices involved. 
CA 2 upheld the DC's injunction against approximately a dozen MCC 
administrative practices. Although the Govt professes to disagree 
"with virtually all" of CA 2's determinations, the SG has decided, 
"in order to avoid unduly complicating this Court's task should it 
elect to grant review in this case," not to seek review of them all. 
In some cases, the adverse impact of CA 2's ruling will be minimal; 
in others, the Bureau is rethinking its position anyway. The SG 
presents five issues for review: 
(1) Overcrowding. CA 2 held that the overcrowded condi-
tions violated detainees' constitutional rights of privacy. Placement 
of bunk beds in private rooms ("double-celling") afforded inmates 
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"virtually no space for minimal privacy or in which to avoid the 
other's presence." Double-celling, moreover, put more pressure on 
the common-area facilities, creating pressure "to eat in the cell, 
with its single chair, open toilet, and unsolicited companion." 
·Because the Govt made "no showing of compelling necessity to justify 
the substantial abrogation of personal privacy imposed by double-cell-
ing," CA 2 held the practice unconstitutional. CA 2 also held that 
the temporary quartering of detainees in the common areas, where "the 
lights burn[ed] all night," gave inmates "no means of securing any 
degree of privacy." Since the MCC had "offered no explanation for 
this completely inadequ~te housing except administrative convenience," 
CA 2 declared it unconstitutional as well. 
The SG replies that the double-celling was confined to 20% of 
the rooms; notes that the rooms were 75 feet square, significantly 
larger than those in previous cases finding overcrowding; and observes 
that detainees in the MCC in any event are confined to their rooms 
for oniy 7-8 hours per day, during which time "they are presumably 
asleep." Testimony at trial, moreover, indicated that double-bunking 
would have no "significant detrimental effects on the physical or, 
psychological health of the inmates." Even assuming that a significan 
abridgment of personal ·privacy did occur, CA 2 erred in evaluating it 
under a "compelling necessity" test that accorded no weight at all to 
the fiscal and administrative constraints the MCC was operating under. 
The level of care did not fall below the minimum threshold of decency 
and humane treatment (citing Feeley). Finally, the SG argues that 
CA 2 has gone far beyond even its own precedents: a previous case, 
cited by CA 2 as support here, involved double-celling in rooms 48 
feet square amid decidedly more archaic and unpleasant surroundings. 
' . Resp relies on the analysis of CA 2 and asserts that the SG s 
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position in this case is "ironic," given that the Govt "has been 
prominent in its criticism of [double-celling] in state and local 
facilities." 
(2) Th~ublisher-only" ~ule. The MCC enforced a Bureau 
of Prisons' rule, applicable to all its facilities, under which in-
mates can receive books only if mailed directly from the publisher 
or a book club. Federal corrections experts testified at trial that 
this rule was adopted to avert substantial security risks occasioned 
by inmates' receipt of books from other sources: books and magazines 
are easily used to smuggle drugs or money into jail; detection of 
these items in book~ is difficult; and an adequate inspection for 
such items often unavoidably destroys the books anyway. CA 2 held 
that the publisher-only rule "severely and impermissibly restricts 
the reading material available to inmates" and thus was "inconsistent 
with both the first amendment and due process." CA 2 dismissed the 
availability of the prison library by finding it "inconveivable that 
the first amendment rights of an incarcerated individual do not extend 
beyond a few, selected titles." CA 2 dismissed a decision of CA 10 
upholding the publisher-only rule, Woods v. Daggett, 541 F2d 237 
(1976), on the grounds that that case involved Leavenworth, where 
security justifications were more compelling. 
The SG urges that the publisher-only rule is a reasonable accomoda-
tion between inmates' interests and prison security concerns. Other 
avenues to reading materials remain open, viz., books mailed from 
publishers and book clubs and books in the prison library. The SG says 
t)iat CA 2 erred in ignoring the unanimous testimony of corrections of-
ficials that an item-by-item inspection of all arriving books would be 
unmanageable. The SG, finally, points to the circuit conflict with 
Daggett. 
Resp contends that the publisher-only rule effectively leaves in-
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mates no options: books cost money, publishers' names are hard to 
get, and the prison library is laughable. Resp asserts that the 
Justice Dept, in a June 1978 draft of Federal Standards for Correction 
has taken the position that inmates "may receive publications from 
any source, subject to search and inspection, except where there is 
clear and convincing evidence to justify limitations." 
(3) Packages. The MCC prohibited inmates from receiving 
packages containing items of personal p~operty. Corrections officials 
testified that this rule was necessary to avoid fighting, stealing, 
and extortion among inmates, and also to limit the introduction of 
contraband. The DC dismissed these concerns as "dire predictions" 
and ordered the MCC to promulgate regulations permitting receipt 
of at least some items. CA 2 agreed, noting that the DC "did no 
more than instruct the MCC to devise reasonable regulations" and 
that its action thus was "not inconsistent with the tenet that pri-
son officials should retain as much control as possible over their 
institutions." Neither the DC nor CA 2 said what constitutional 
provision was violated by the no-packages rule. 
The SG contends that CA 2's holding gives no deference to the 
security concerns voiced by expert witnesses at trial. There was 
no suggestion in the record that these concerns were disingenuous or 
exaggerated, a nd under these circumstances the regulation should have 
been upheld unless the corrections officials had been "conclusively 
shown to be wrong." Jones v North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 
433 US at 128. Resp contends that the regulation was arbitrary and 
capricious since inmates could purchase items of personal property 
, 
at the commissary anyway--which presumably should give rise to the 
same "security" problems--and since there were other ways of policing 
introduction of contraband. 
f 
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(4) Room searches. The MCC required inmates to leave their 
rooms during routine inspections for contraband. Trial testimony 
indicated that the rule was necessary to avoid friction between in-
mates and prison officials and to thwart attempts to conceal contra-
band. CA 2 held that this requirement was unconstitutional. 
The searches were "far from neat" and often caused tension among 
-
inmates who "suspected the officers of thievery." CA 2 saw 
no reason whatsoever not to permit a detainee to observe 
the search of his room and belongings from a reasonable 
distance. This is a small privilege to grant him and 
reassures the detainee's already diminished sense of con-
trol over self, that he still has some small private dom-
ain, while at the same time not interfering with the 
institution's security concern and the removal of possible 
contraband. 
The SG contends that "[t]here is no authority for the proposi-
tion that persons--either inside or outside of jail--have a privacy 
interest that requires that lawful searches of their premises be con-
ducted in their presence." The SG points out that CA 2's finding of 
"no reason whatsoever" not to permit detainees to observe the search 
was inconsistent with the evidence at trial. The SG contends·, 
finally, that CA 2 has ignored this Court's injunction that prison of-
ficials, "not courts, [make] the difficult judgments concerning in-
stitutional operations in situations such as this." Jones, supra, 
433 US at 128. 
Resp replies that, given the circumstances under which the in-
spections were made, the search would be "unreasonable" absent detaine E: 
observation. The officers rummaged through possessions willy-nilly 
and their actions constituted, in CA 2's words, a "regime of tyranny." 
Resp contends that prohibiting detainees from being present is an 
overbroad means of thwarting attempts to conceal contraband. 
(5) Body Searches. The MCC, unlike many prisons, permits 
inmates t:o have "contact visits" with guests, i.e., interviews 
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without a glass or wire screen intervening between the interlocutors. 
Because contact visits "present a unique opportunity for passing con-
traband, including weapons and drugs, into the Jail," Feeley, supra, 
570 F2d at 373, the MCC requires inmates after contact visits to 
strip naked and expose their armpits and the soles of their feet. 
In addition, they are required to submit their anal and genital areas 
to visual inspectio~1. The DC left the basic strip search undisturbed, 
but found that the anal and genital inspe·ations "plunged the inmate 
into a deep level of degradation and submission." He enjoined such 
visual inspections absent probable cause to believe that an inmate 
is hiding contraband. - CA 2 agreed. It noted that the MCC had 
proved "only one instance in the several years of [the practice's] 
existence when contraband was found during a body cavity inspection," 
and held that the "gross violation of personal privacy inherent in 
such a search cannot be outweighed by the government's security in-
terest in maintaining a practice of so little actual utility." CA 2 
found that the procedure "shocks one's conscience," citing Rochin 
v. California. 
The SG notes that body cavity searches have been upheld by CA 10 
and by DCs in five other circuits. He contends that CA 2 erred in 
finding such searches of "little actual utility;" this observation 
"wholly ignores the substantial deterrent effect that such searches 
inevitably have on efforts to pass contraband to inmates during con-
tact visits." The MCC's search policy, says the SG, is a necessary 
concomitant to its relatively liberal policies in allowing contact 
V\Sits, policies the MCC is reluctant to restrict. The SG contends, 
finally, that CA 2 has again improperly substituted its judgment for 
that of prison officials. 
Resp contends that body searches are unnecessary, since the Govt's 
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security intere scan be achieved by far ess restrictive means. 
Passing of contraband during contact visits is virtually impossible, 
since inmates and visitors are constantly monitored by officials 
through visiting-rogm windows, inmates wear one-piece jumpsuits which 
make surreptitious concealment of contraband impracticable, and 
inmates are not permitted to use the visiting-area rest room where 
passage of contraband might occur. Concealment of objects in the 
anal_area also produces an "unusual gait" which invites suspicion. 
Resp notes, finally, that the Justice Dept's 1978 draft Standards 
propose to allow body cavity searches only when contact visits are 
"not constantly monitored." As noted above, contact visits at the 
-
MCC are so monitored. 
5. DISCUSSION. The issues the SG presents for review defy easy 
answers no less than they defeat terse statement. Although cases 
involving the rights of pretrial detainees have flooded the lower 
courts in recent years, this Court has never dealt with these ques-
tions comprehensively--a fact that lower courts have both noted and 
bemoaned. Although this Court's pronouncements on the rights of 
convicted prisoners have figured largely in those courts' considera-
tions, those pronouncements--involving persons with considerably 
diminished "liberty" interests--have been as often distinguished as 
followed. 
Given the frequency with which pretrial detainment questions arise 
the circuit conflict as to the proper constitutional standard of re-
view is bound to cause confusion among the district courts. The 
SG is correct, I believe, in saying that the three-way conflict is 
b'oth substantial and real. The "compelling necessity" test adopted 
by CA 2 below, moreover, seems problematic on a practical no less than 
on a theoretical level: it is hard to imagine any restriction that 
could pass constitutional muster thereunder. Once fiscal and adminis-
. " . .. 
I .._ 
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trative justifications are eliminated, bail itself may stand con-
demned. House arrest could do the job, albeit more expensively, 
as well. 
This case, additionally, presents questions of pretrial detainment 
in a peculiarly unadulterated guise. This case does not involve 
ramshackle jailhouses in remote county seats, equipped with the 
Dickensian amenities of an archaic age. It involves a modern federal 
facility built three years ago, designed and equipped with the best 
that contemporary architecture and penology can devise. If the 
Govt has not succeeded here, one is tempted to aespair of success 
at_ all. · 
Finally, despite the large number of pretrial detainment cases 
that have been decided in the past three years, this is apparently 
the ~ rst case in which the SG has sought cert. It is hard not 
to suspect that he has been "sandbagging," waiting for the right 
case to come along. In my judgment, CA 2 in this case has cooperated 
handsomely. 
Grant. 
There is a response. 
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tent telephone use should be allowed pre-
trial detainees should be recon idered with 
particular formula left to sound discretion 
of jail officials. 
11. Prisons G=4(6) 
Searches and Seizures C:= 3.2 
Surveillance procedures employed by 
county jail officials, who disavowed any 
attention of scanning mail sent to counsel, 
public officials or the news media, were 
permissible and officials were not required 
to obtain search warrant be fore opening 
mail sent by pretrial detainees. U .S.C.A. 
Const. Amend. 1. 
12. Prisons G=4(7) 
While complete prohibition of personal 
belongings of pretrial detainees at county 
jail was not reasonably related to asserted 
state interest in security and order, list of 
approved items ordered by the district court 
was far too extensive in light of appropri-
ate standard of review and accordingly re-
mand was necessary to afford jail officials 
opportunity to determine in the first in-
st a nce what personal items could be allowed 
in detainees' cells without unduly hamper-
ing efforts of officials to m2intain order 
and security. 
13. Constitutional Law G::=>262 
Prisons C= 13(9) 
In light of already elaborate procerlural 
safeguards to which county jail officials 
had acceded, and in light of sta'e 's very real 
interest in order and security, pretrial de-
tainees did not have right to rc:tain counsel 
in a ll disciplinary proceedings but rather 
due process required only t hat those ac-
cused of di sciplinary infractions obtain 
some form of legal counselling where illiter-
acy or complex ity of issues made it unlikely 
that detainee would be able <'. -'eqnatcly to 
apprehend case unassisted. 
14. Prisons C= 4(4) 
Mere relative worsen ing ;n conditions 
of legitimate confinement of ,>retrial de-
tainee does not trigger any c · nstiLutional 
interest, as long as " nature ,,,.d duration" 
• Of the United States Court of Customs and 
PatPnt Appeals, sitting by desigr,:ot ion. 
of new form of incarceration does not ex-
ceed original purpose for which detainee 
was committed. 
15. Constitutional Law G=262 
Prisons G= 13.5(3) 
Pretrial detai!1ee_s, who under state law 
could be transferred to state prison from 
county jail upon recommendation of sheriff 
with approval ,ef county commissioners, had 
no claim grounded in state law to which due 
process might attach in connection with 
transfers and thus were not entitled to pro-
cedural prerequisites to transfers specified 
by the district court. RSA N.H. 623:3. 
Carleton Eldredge Stratham, N. H., for 
defendants, appellants. 
Douglass P. Hill, Portsmouth, N. H., with 
whom Robert D. Gross, Manchester, N. H., 
was on brief, for plaintiffs, appellees. 
Before COFI<'IN, Chief Judge, MARKEY, 
Chief Judge,• CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge. 
LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge. 
Having recently considered questions re-
garding the constitutional rights of sen-
tenced prisoners,1 we now confront ques-
tions relative to the status of unconvicted 
persons ("detainees") awaiting trial. This 
appeal by Frew1'Iampshire county officials 
is from a judgment of the district court 
ordering changes in the conditions under 
which detainees are confined at the Rock-
ingham County J ai l (the J ail). The changes 
are intended to br ing the conditions under 
which this category of prisoners is confined 
into conformity with the Constitution. The 
J ail, an ~ldcrly structure, was transform ed , 
in 1961 from a house of correction to its 
prc~ent status. As well as detainees await-
ing trial, it houses men serving short misde-
meanor sentences. The present cfass ~ ion 
under 42 o."S.e. § 1983 was brought by a 
detainee who later, upon conviction, went 
on to scrYe his ~rntr nee in the New Hamp· 
shire State Pri son. He has been joined as 
I. See Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 561 F.2d 411 (1st 
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plaintiff by other detainc'?s, and after dis- two bunk beds, mattresses, sheets, pillows, 
covery proceedings and in response to plain- blankets, a single shelf and a protected 
tiffs' motion for partial summary judgment light bulb. The third tier cells face win-
the district court entered the order appeal- <lows some 8½ feet away, across the tier. 
ed from. When suit was brought, detainees were al-
Some of the facts that were before the 
district court concerning the condition of 
detainees at the Jail are as follows: In 1975 
the average length of a detainee's stay in 
the Jail was only about seven days. How-
ever, a stay of from three to four months 
was not uncommon and a few detainees 
were there for as long as eight or nine 
months. Detainees made up some 20-40 
per cent -of the population, which on the 
average totalled about fifty. Prior to the 
district court's intervention, the detainees 
were relegated to fourteen cells in the third 
tier, often two to a cell. 
The detainees consist of persons accused 
of unbailable offenses , such as first a'egr; e 
murder, and t~ ake 
~ I or to -9.ualify for rJ lease on rec£$ni-
zance.2 Although presumptively innocent 
ofthe crimes for which they are being held 
I 
for trial, detainees are almost invariably 
charged with misconduct far more seri ous 
than t e minor mis emeanors for which 
conv1ctectoffender; ~re serv ing time in t he 
Jail. Thus they may pose security prob-
lems, on one recentoccaslon having mur-
dered a guard and more regularly engaging 
in incidents such as fights , arson , and the 
like "every couple of days", (Deposition of 
Sheriff Sampson). Detainees with drug or 
alcohol problems, only recently having been 
removed from the outside, are said to 
present special probl ems. Because the con-
victed misdemeanants work outside during 
the day, apparently with rather minimal 
security arrangements, contrauand is easi ly 
smuggled to detainees inside the facility. 
The detainees' cells are sma ll (7' X 5' X 
6½') and contain a sink-toilet enmhination, 
2. Under New Hampshire law, only first degree 
murder and offenses punishable by death a re 
non-bailable crimes. NH RSA 597: I. Release 
on personal recognizance is required in misde-
meanors and is a\'ailable in felonies if the indi-
vidual is deemed to be not a risk to himself or 
lowed out during the day only op the 36' X 
4' walkway adjoining their cells. They 
were not allowed to use the Jail's day room 
with television, radio, gat'hes, ping-pong ta-
ble and "library" (apparently 75 assorted 
books left behind by inmates), nor to use 
other recreational equipment, or participate 
in work programs. Their meals were 
served in the cells or on the tier, although 
the sentenced inmates ate in a dining room. 
Detainees were permitted three showers a 
week while those sentenced to the J a il cou ld 
shower at any reasonable time. 
Visits took place in a portion of the first 
floor which was partitioned by a thinly 
meshed steel screen with benches on both 
sides. Inmates and their visitors could not 
touch one another. Conversations were, 
however, not monitored. There were no 
private facilities for consultations between 
attorney and client. 
A detainee had to sign a statement con-
sen ting to the censorship of his mail; if he 
refused, all mail was withheld from him. 
Incoming mail, except lawyer's legal corre-
spondence and letters to the media and 
public officials , was opened and scanned. 
Books, magazines and newspapers were 
censored for content. Outgoing mai l, ex-
cept legal correspondence and letters to the 
med ia and public officials, was opened and 
scanned. 
It was the CU§,tom of the Jail without any 
notice or hearing whatever lo transfer in-
mates who acted up to "discipline" cells on 
the first tier or to the "safe-keeping" cell 
located in a tunnel connecting the Jail wi th 
another building. Confinement continu ed 
until "the problem conduct abate[d)." 
others and likely to appear. NH RSA 597:6 a. 
Since August of 1975, any person charged with 
an offense may appea l from the local courts to 
the Superior Court for a reduction in bai l or for 
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The Jail was administered virtually with-
out written or oral rules. Correctional offi-
cers were told to use commonsense in disci-
plining. Decisions about who could visit 
and what mail would be censored were left 
up to the individual officers. 
II 
The district court summarized the issues 
before it as follows: 
1. May defendants subject pretrial de-
tainees to harsher conditions of confine-
ment than those imposed upon sentenced 
prisoners; 
2. Must defendants alter their Yisitation 
practices; 
3. Must defendants provide plaintiffs 
greater access to telephones; 
4. Must defendants alter their mail cen-
sorship practices; 
5. Must defendants permit plaintiffs to 
possess various items of personal property ; 
6. Must defendants promulgate and dis-
tribute written, objective and reasonable 
rules governing the operation of the jail 
and delineating the rights an d responsibil-
ities of inmates; 
7. Must defendants adopt certain disci-
plinary procedures; 
8. Must defendants alter their practices 
concerning transfers of pretrial ch:tainecs to 
the New Hampshire State Prison. 
Before addressing each of these ques-
tions, the court undertook to set out the 
principles it would apply. It said th at de-
tainees are "presumptively innocent ind i-
viduals" and that they therefore "rdain all 
the rights of free citizens" except that their 
mobility is necessarily curtailed and they 
must be subject to certain li mitations to 
protect institutional srcurity. The court 
felt that under the qua! prottction clause 
"any distinction Ix tween tho~e detained 
and those free on bond must be based solely 
upon the precautions the state must take to 
assure the appearance of the accused at 
trial". ~foreo\ er, trec1tment of the detain-
ees had to be cq ual to or less onerous than 
that accorded com·icted offenders , "other-
wise, the incarceration becomes punishment 
in violation of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment". In conclu-
sion the court stated1 that "[t]he conditions 
of pretrial confinement must be the least 
restrictive means of achieving the state's 
sole legitimat~ end, the presence of the 
accused at trial," and that all restrictions, 
to be constitutional, had to be justified by 
"compelling necessity". 
The court then applied these principles to 
the different grievances, ordering extensive 
relief. Only some of these remedial rulings, 
altering and improving conditions at the 
Jail, have been appealed. Officials have 
accepted the court's order that detainees be 
lodged in single cells and be permitted ac-
cess to the same exercise and recreational 
facilities as sentenced prisoners; they have 
accepted some but not all modifications of 
visitation and mail censorship practices ; 
they have accepted the court's order that 
written rules and regulations be promulgat-
ed setting forth the detainees' rights and 
obligations and the procedures for infrac-
tions; and they have accepted certain as-
pects of court ordered disciplinary proce-
dures. We need consider only those orders, 
described below, from which an appeal was 
taken. Before turning to the specific ex-
ceptions, we shall consider generall w at 
constitutiona constr~ fourteenth 
amendment imposes upon state and local 
authorities in the- treatment of unconvicted 
detainees. 
.,. III 
[1] At 1:omrnon law pretrial detainees 
were differen 1a e from sentenced prison-
ers. Blackstone said that 
"imprisonment [of those awaiting trial], 
as has been said, is ·only for safe custody, 
and not for_ punishment: thcicfore, in 
this dubious interval between the com-
mitment and trial, a prisoner ought to be 
used with the utmost . humanity, and nei-
ther be loadl'C! with needless fetters, nor 
subjeeted to other hardships than such as 
are absolutely re4uisite for the purpose of 
confinement only . " 
., 
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4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *300. In serves" the state's interest in ensuring the 
prohi~ ng excessjye btzil, the eighth detainee's presence, jail order and security 
amendment both, limits pretrial confine- has been accepted as a consideration enti-
ment to situations where presence at trial tled to great weight when balancing the 
cannot be safely assured by means other state's interest against the liberty interest 
than confinement, see Stack v. Boyle, 342 of detainees. Main Road v. Aytch, 565 F.2d 
U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3 (l95l), and 54 (3d Cir. 1977); Smith v. Shimp, 562 F.2d 
tacitly indicates the Founders' acceptance 423 (7th Cir. 1977). 
of the practi ce of pretrial confinement in 
such special cases. 
While the Supreme Court has not yet 
discussed the status of detainees, there is 
general agreement among at least the four 
federal circuit courts that have ruled that 
the states may constitutionally deprive de-
t ainees of liberty only to the extent neces-
sary to ensure their presence at trial.3 Du-
ran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1976); 
United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 
F .2d 823, 827 (3d Cir. 1976); Rhem v. Mal-
colm, · 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 1974); An-
derson v. Nasser, 456 F .2d 835, 837-38 (5th 
Cir. 1972) (en bane) (modifying 438 F.2d 183 
(5th Cir. 1971)), cert. den ied, 409 U.S. 848, 
93 S.Ct. 53, 34 L.Ed.2d 89 (1972). 
These decisions refl ect a strong consensus 
that restriction,s designed only to serve 
some fu nction irrelevant, or more burden-
some th an necessary, to secure the detain-
ee 's presence at t rial are constitutionally 
impermissible. However, as the mainte-
nance of institutional security "directly 
3. A further valid reason fo r pre-trial detention 
in some instances might possibly be to protect 
the public against a da ngerous individual, but 
as this ground would not a lter the analysis or 
the outcome in cases like the presen t , there is 
no need to pursue it. 
4. Pretrial confinement is not, however, a spe-
cies of illegal or improper confinemen t , lacking 
in due process. The lower court seems, to 
some degree , t o have so believed in ins isti ng 
th at pret,ial confinees had to be extended 
rights comparable to those on bai l. The eight h 
;,mrndmen t by necessary implication contem-
1lil.tes the use of pretrial confinement in appro-
priate cases. A detainee wi ll have received due 
process in the form of some kind of probable 
cause determination and a bai l hearing; and he 
has the right to a speedy trial. See Gerstein v. 
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct . 854, 43 L.Ed .2d 54 
(1975); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 
5'75, 21 L.Ed .2d 607 (I 969); cf Ierardi v. Gun-
ter, 528 F.2d 929 (I st Cir. 1976); Greci v. 
Birknes, 527 F.2d 956 (ht Cir. 1976) (due proc-
ess requirements for detention pursuan t to ex-
[2] Apart from more specific guarantees 
such as the first amendmeRt, the constitu-
tional provision most commonly, and we 
think accurately, cited as protecting detain-
ees is the du e process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. See: e. g., Duran v. 
Elrod, supra. In an analogous context, the 
Supreme Court has said, "At the least, due 
process requires that the natu re and dura-
tion of comm itment bear some reasonable 
relation to the urpose for which the indi-
vid~ l is co!:1mitted." Jackson v. Indiana, 
406 U.S. 715, 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 1858, 32 
L.Ed.2d 435 (1972). See McNeil v. Director, 
Patuxent In stitution, 407 U.S. 245, 249-50, 
92 S.Ct. 2083, 32 L.Ed.2d 719 (1972). Com-
pare O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 
573- 75, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975). 
Restrictions or cond itions of confinement I 
that are without re,,sonable relation to the 
state 's purpose in confining a detainee -his 
production at trial violate due process.4 
tradition). V/hi le a detainee is presumptively 
innocent, thi s sta t us does not req uire hi s j ailers 
to act as if he were not a security ri sk . As the 
Third Circui t has put it, 
"We note that some courts have apparent -
ly rrlied ui.,on the 'presumption of innocence ' 
in cases invol\'ing pretrial detainees. How-
ever, we do not believe that principle serves 
as the source for those substantive rights . 
Rathe r, the presumption all oca tes the bu rd en 
o f proof. It is a principle of evidence, . 
acting as the foun~tion fo r t he procedural 
due process requirement of proof beyon d a 
reasonable doubt. . . If the 'presump-
tion of innocence' is read literal ly to apply to 
a ll pret1;a1 procedures, it is impossible to 
j usti fy bail or pretrial detent io n, both of 
which a re imposed upon the accused despi te 
the presumption." 
Ha 1pton v. J!olmcsb11rg Prison Officials, 546 
F.2d 1077, 1080 n. I (3d Cir. 1976) [cita tions 
o, ,ci ttPd]. 
~· , ~. 
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[3] In the absence of further guidance 
from the Supreme Court it is less clear that, 
aside from specific guarantees such as the 
first amendment, other constitutional provi-
sions apply. The Second Circuit has held 
L fl -Z--- that the eighth amendment does not apply 
~ ~ to pretrial detainees because they are ,!l£.t 
jlA,-Y' , '!)ublished. See John son v. Glick, 481 
)028, fo's2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 
1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 32 
(1973); cf. Anderson v. Nasser, supra. See 
also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 97 
S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977). Several 
district courts have reached a different re-
sult, see e. g., Johnson v. Lark, 365 F.Supp. 
289, 302 (E.D.Mo.1973); Collins v. Schoon-
field, 344 F .Supp. 257, 264- 65 (D.Md.1972); 
Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F.Supp. 93, 99- 100 
(N.D.Ohio 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 854 (6th 
Cir. 1972). See also Anderson v. Nasser 
supra, 456 F.2d at 842 (Tuttle, J., dissent-
ing). Like the Seventh Circuit we believe 
that whether or not the eighth amendment 
is directly applicable , precedent under the 
ei~h~h ..:_m; ndn:._ent_!s rele~ant anaper-
suas1ve m etamee cases, Duran v. Elrod, 
supra, 542 F.2d at 999--1000. The due proc-
ess clause requires a state to play its limited 
custodial role in a reasonable, and hence a 
humane, manner. It is impossible to con-
ce ive of situations where treatment so cruel 
or barbaric as to violate the eighth amend-
ment if visited upon a, sentenced prisoner 
would satisfy a detainee's due process 
righ ts. Loading a detainee with chains and 
placing him in a dungeon might, it is true, 
further the state's interest in en~uring, his 
presence at trial; but as it is obvious that in 
virtually all cases this purpose could be 
promoted without such harsh measures, re-
sor t to them would ordinari ly violate due 
process. 
While the eighth amendment- whether 
~ or not directly applicable- provides a rele-
$ ~ vant standard, the role of the equal protec-
" ~n detainee cases is more ques-
r~,1_c-,~:~1~:~i 2~assifieations by the state must 
~ ~. ~ll1c,ve a rational basis, and to that extent the 
w,~~qual protection clause rnay be said to forti-
/r fy a dctainee's right, already protected un-
der the due process clause, to be treated in 
a manner rationally related to the limited 
purpose for which he is imprisoned. But 
this concept of equal protection adds little 
if anything to the due process analysis. 
Those district courts, including the court 
below, that have engaged in equal protec-
tion analysis have usually adopted a "strict 
scrutiny" approach, under which \a state 
carries a burden of justifying every restric-
tion imposed upon an inmate ~n the basis of 
"compe11ing interest", and must further 
demonstrate that each measure taken is the 
"least restrictive alternative". The court 
below erroneously construed our decision in 
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisen-
stadt, 494 F .2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 977, 95 S.Ct. 239, 42 L.Ed.2d 189 
(197 4), as endorsing this form of analysis. 
Without questioning the correctness of the 
district court's ultimate judgments in Ei-
senstadt, 360 F .Supp. 676 (D.Mass.1973), we 
observe that the appeal in that case was 
li mited to issues entirely unrelated to the 
matter of strict scrutiny. This court ac-
cordingly never had occasion to pass on the 
question. 
As we indicated in Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 
561 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1977), strict scrutiny 
has not found favor in the Supreme Court's 
prisoner cases; an d \\'hile the state's control 
oYer detainees is for a more limited purpose 
than that over convicts, we are unpersuad-
ed that th is approach is viable even as to 
detainees. The Court has said that strict 
scrutiny of legislative classifications is ap-
propriate only when "the classification im-
permissiLly interferes with the exercise of a 
fundamental right or operates to the pecu-
liar disadvantage of a susprct class." Mass. 
Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 
307, 312, 96 S.Ct. 256&, 2566, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 
(1976) [footnote omitted]. Detainees are 
not a suspect class, and while confinement 
restricts liberty, a basic right, the Court has 
yet to suggest, in any way, that the dialec-
tic between confinement and liberty trig-
gcrs strict scrutiny ana lysis. Id. at n. 3. In 
pr· oner cases inYolving first amendment 
rights - where it is most clear that eYen 
sentenced prisoners retain important consti-
tutional protections- the Court has declined 
to shift the burden of justification wholly to 
the state. 
na Pris01 
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the state. Rather, in Jones v. North Caroli-
na Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 
119, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977), the 
Court described the appropriate posture of 
judicial review: 
"Without a showing that these beliefs [in 
danger to security] were unreasonable, it 
was error for the District Court to con-
clude that [the officials] needed to show 
more. In particular, the burden was not 
on [the officials) to show affirmatively 
that the Union would be 'detrimental to 
proper penological objectives' or would 
constitute a 'present danger to security 
and order.' Rather '[s]uch con-
siderations are peculiarly within the prov-
ince and professional expertise of correc-
tions officials, and, in the absence of sub-
stantial evidence in the record to indicate 
that the officials have exaggerated their 
response to these considerations, courts 
should ordinarily defer to their expert 
judgment in such matters.' " 
Id. at 127-28, 97 S.Ct. at 2539, quoling Pell 
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827, 94 S.Ct. 
2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974). See also 
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 832-33, 97 
S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). 
[ 4] ile detainees are not convicts, the 
sam e practical reasons that counsel judicial 
restraint in second-guessin~ correctional of-
ficials dictates restraintin second-guessing 
the authorities who run jails. See Main 
Road v. Aytch, supra, 565 F.2d at 57. We 
believe that the pro er standard by which 
to review the actions o t ose lawfully en-
tru~tcd with the custody of detainees is that 
normally employed in reviewing adminis-
trative actions: whether the actions of jail 
au thori ti~s are arbitrary or ca g_ricious; 
whethcrtTicy are lack ing in a reasonable 
1 '-~ to the linTTtctrpurposc qi,_ the 
confinement; and wheth er they arc other-
wise n6tin ac~ rdance with law. 
Strict scrutiny review would have the 
far-reaching effect of substituting "the val-
ues and judgment of a court for the values 
and judgnwnt of the legislature and prison 
administration". Nadeau v. Hclgcmoe, su-
pra, 561 F.2d at 417. Wlio is to say what is 
the "l:ast restricti\'e alternative" within the 
means of the state? Who is tQ,, sav whal 
security precautions are "compelled'' rather 
than merely = rudent? We do not think 
t a t e onst1tution requires, or indeed 
that it would be feasible or desirable, for 
judges to make decisions as to all the de-
tails of jail life, overriding the judgments, 
if reasonable, of both legislators and jail 
• I 
authorities. 
[5] The court below adopted as a yard-
stick for measuring detainees' righ~, a pre-
sumptive rule that it is unconstitutional to 
treat a detainee less well in any particular 
than a sentenced inmate. But while the 
treatment of other prisoners is relevant to 
whether or not a detainee is being treated 
with unnecessary restrictiveness, it is not 
conclusive. Facilities for short-term jail 
prisoners need not be as comprehensive in 
all respects as those provided for one serv-
ing a term of years. A detainee with a 
notorious record as a bank robber may not 
be entitled to as len ient security conditions 
as someone serving a misdemeanor sen-
tence. Constitutional rights cannot be 
defined in terms of literal comparisons of 
this nature. Indeed, relying on comparisons 
to establish the level of a prisoner's rights 
could leave the state free to make every-
one's lot worse instead of better. Nadeau 
v. Helgemoc, supra, 561 F.2d at 417. 
In rejecting strict equal protection analy-
sis, we do not denigrate the role of courts in 
enjoining conditions found to be inhumane 
or irrational. Restrictions upon detainees 
that ser\'e no proper purpose, but merely 
reflect the lat:k of im:igination or energy of 
local offa:ials, are properly the subject of 
judicial correction; so too are conditions 
which, for whatever reason, fall below mini-
mum standards of humanity and decency. 
It is not suggested that the unappealed 
orders of the di strict court, bringing abou t 
impro\'ements at the Jail, might not be 
supportable on proper grounds. We do 
hol<l however that judicial review in a case 
like 
1
this shou i'd proceed under the standard 
1,e k,\'C, cscribed 11ith proper defcre11t:e to 
be acc0r,kd legi:shtiYe and local judgments 
especially in the area of security within and 
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We now turn to the specific questions 
raised in this appeal. 
IV 
1. Visitation 
[6] Prior to this litigation, visitation was 
permitted twice a week between 1 and 3 
p. m., with visits to last a maximum of one-
half hour each. The court found that 
"( e Jach detainee theoretically had a total of 
four visiting hours per week". Detainees 
were not allowed to touch their visitors , 
who were separated from them by a mesh 
screen. The limitation of visits to two spe-
cific days from 1 to 3 p. m. was altered by 
the administration during the pendency of 
these proceedings, so that visits are now 
allowed "at all reasonable times"; however, 
the administration did not indicate how 
many visits would be allowed, and plaintiffs 
complain that in failing to specify limits the 
administration meant to retain arbitrary 
control of visits on an ad hoc basis. The 
court undertook to clarify matters by order-
ing that each detainee be allowed three 
hours of visits a day. It also ordered that 
prisoners be allowed to have physical con-
tact and communication with their visitors. 
The authorities complain that the three-
hour rule will "produce severe overcrowd-
ing to the detriment of jail security and 
visitation conditions". ThE;Y also are of the 
view that the opportunities for conveying 
contraband or taking a hostage are too 
great to allow eontact visits . 
Visitation rights, besides having to meet 
the previously described due proces; stan-
dard, reflect first amendment values, most 
clearly the right of association. The Su-
preme Court has recently said, in the case 
of convicts, that the "assoeiational rights 
that the First Amendment protects outside 
of prison walls" are "the most obvious of 
the First Amendment rights that are neces-
sarily curtailed by confinemen t". Jones, 
;,upra, 433 U.S. at 125 26, 97 S.Ct. at 2540. 
This was saicl , howeYcr, in the context of an 
asserted right of prisoners to unionize a 
novel ~sertion posing an obvious threat to 
prison administration. For detainees to re-
ceive visits a t regular intervals from Joyed 
ones and friends is a commonly accepted 
privilege; has been recognized at the Jail; 
and implicates, in the case of detainees es-
pecially, communicative as well as associa-
tional values protected by the first amend-
ment. A refusal, therefore, to allow the 
ordinary detainee any visitation privileges, 
or the laying down of capricious limitations 
not justified by considerations of jail securi-
ty and order, would be uncon~titutional. 
See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 
411- 12, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974). 
The Constitution does not, however, require 
that visitation be allowed on every day of 
the week. What days and hours and cir-
cumstances are reasonable is largely for the 
local authorities to decide in the first in-
stance, subject only to limited court review 
for arbitrariness. Except where their deci-
sions are arbitrary, a court must normally 
defer to the judgment of jail authorities. 
Jones, supra. 
[7] In the present instance, the district 
court could conclude that is was arbitrary 
and capricious for Jail authorities, after 
abolishing the restrictive twice-weekly rule, 
not to issue a new rule or rules of general 
application clarifying what amount of visit-
ing would be permitted. No valid security 
reason was presented for denying detainees 
and their relatives and friends a set of 
standards enabling them to plan visits. 
The situation which the court properly 
sought to correct was one that left each 
detainee at the unfettered discretion or 
whim of the sheriff and his assistants. 
However, only if the authorities decline 
to promulgate any rule although invited to 
do so, or insist upon a patently inadequate 
one , ~hould eourts pro11rnlgate their own 
rules . The Jail is entitled to drcide how 
many hours a week of visits are feasible, 
taking accoun t both of the physic.al limita-
tions of the Jail and the reasonable internal 
:rnd external security needs of the institu-
tion. The authorities should have a further 
opportunity in light of this opinion to initi-
ate a rule ,,·hich the court may then reject 
if it $hould be capricious or otherwise un-
justifie<l. We vacate the three-hour re-
quirement and remand for further proceed-
ings which , 
establish, ar 
suitable spe· 
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ings which will allow the Jail authorities to court as long as it is rationally supportable. 
establish, and the court further to review, a The humanity and possible soothing effect 
suitable specific visitation rule. of contact visits are qualities that Jail offi-
[8] As for contact visits we can discover cials properly should consider in passing on 
no constitutional guarante~ that such visits their desirability. But whatever the wis-
may take place. The question is simply dom of a decision to reject these benefits in 
whether considerations of Jail security and favor of a harsher regimen for detainees, 
order make it reasonable for the authorities we cannot say that the choice is unsupport-
to refuse visits of this nature. In ordering able. The term of con_fi~ment at the Jail 
such visits over the wishes of Jail authori- is often very brief-in many cases only a 
ties, the court relied on the fact that con- week or less-and a substantial number of 
tact visits were allowed at the New Hamp- detainees have only. recently been removed 
shire State Prison. That is a factor rele- from drug or alcohol habits. Consequently 
vant in decid ing whether the exclusion of we reverse the order of the district court to 
contact visits is an arbitrary practice, but it the extent it requires contact visits at the 
is not conclusive. That institution may be Jail. If the Jail officials have found that 
constructed so that contact visits are more their experience under the court order has 
manageable, or there may be other factors eased some of their fears about contact 
making such visits feasible there. There visits and demonstrated benefits to the de-
may_ even be legitimate differences of opin- tainees, it is of course open to them, as a 
ion among state and local authorities as to matter of choice, to continue the practice. 
what practices are safe within their particu-
lar institutions. Unless the denial of con- 2. Telephone Privileges 
tact visits on security grounds can be found, 
on the basis of evidence of record, and with 
reasonable deference to the expertise of Jail 
authorities, to be an "exaggerated" re-
sponse by Jail officials, see Jones, supra, the 
district court should not have substituted its 
judgment as to security needs for that of 
the officials. 
[9] We do not believe such a finding can 
be made on this record. Contact Yisits 
present a unique opportunity for passing 
contraband, including weapons and drugs, 
into the Jail. The district court suggested 
that authorities could guard against this 
danger by searching both visitors and de-
tainees, but this observatjon only highlights 
the difficulty of outsiders substituting thei r 
judgment as to how a jail should be ru n for 
that of those responsible for the institution. 
ViRitors and detainees might resent thor-
ough searches as too intrusive, and Jail 
officials might believe contraband could 
still slip through in spite of the most exten-
sive precautions. That the responsible au-
thorities have chosen one particular method 
of countering a ('Onc,·rled thr<'at to the se-
curity of the .Tail, and not soi ,e other , ou1,h t 
to be a decision sustained by a reYiewing 
[10] The district court ordered Jail au-
thorities to permit inmates a reasonable 
number of daily social telephone calls, not 
to exceed ten minutes each. The court 
justified the order by comparing the status 
of detainees to that of bailees: 
"Persons freed on bail have full and free 
access to telephones and may call anyone 
to discuss any matter without having to 
account for the reasons for the call. This 
court does not know of, and defendants 
have not put forward, any reason why 
plaintiffs, as incarcerated accused, should 
not be allowed the same access." 
This standard is incm rect both because 
the court wrongly compared the freedom of 
those on bail and of detainees, and because 
the court wrongly placed the burden of 
j ustification entirely upon the state. By 
applying too"'deman<ling a standard to the 
actions of the Jail au1horities, the court 
failed to consider whether limitations on 
telephone use reasonably reflected legiti-
mate apprehensions about the security and 
order of the Jai l. At the same time, the 
J:oiil 01ficials <lid not introduce evidence suf-
ficient to assess the re2 sonablcncss of their 
assertion that a complete ban on social calls 
,. 
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is necessary to satisfy their proper concerns. 
The matter is not free from doubt: numer-
ous courts have confronted the question of 
access to telephones by detainees and, al-
though many have used a standard of re-
view more exacting than that we believe 
appropriate, the consensus has been in fa-
vor of at least some access. Compare Dil-
lard v. Pitchess, 399 F.Supp. 1225, 1240 
(C.D.Cal.1975); Inmates of the Suffolk 
County Jail v. Eisenstadt, supra, 360 
F .Supp. at 690; Collins v. Schoonfield, su-
pra, 344 F.Supp. at 279; Brenneman v. Ma-
digan, 343 F.Supp. 128, 141 (N.D.Cal.1972); 
Jones v. Wittenberg, supra, 330 F.Supp. 
707, 719 (N.D.Ohio 1971), with Inmates of 
Milwaukee County Jail v. Petersen, 353 
F.Supp. 1157, 1169 (E.D.Wis.1973). Al-
though the Jail permitted detainees to re-
ceive calls from their attorneys, the restric-
tion ·was so 'all-encompassing as to limit the 
ability of a detainee to investigate and pre-
pare his defense. Cf. Bounds v. Smith, 
supra. 
Consequently we believe the district 
court should reconsider this portion of its 
order in light of legitimate concerns ex-
pressed by Jail authorities with regard to 
security. Evidence as to how other, similar 
facilities handle the problem and as to what 
security risks exist at the Jail would be 
useful. Jail officials and the court might 
consider reasonable ways of accommodating 
the inferests of detainees with those of the 
Jail, such as by m~king access to a tele-
phone contingent on recognition of the au-
thority of guards to monitor the conversa-
tions. The particular formula for regulat-
ing telephone use shou ld Le left to the 
sound discretion of Jail officia'ls, subject to 
review by the district court to guard 
against unreasonable restrictions. 
3. Jfoil Privileges 
[11] The district court upheld the au-
thority of Jail officials to inspect incoming 
mail but ruled that mail sent by detainees 
should not be opened without a search war-
rant. It reasoned that because detainees' 
\'isits wen t unmonitored, escape plans or 
contraband "drops" could be plotted regard-
less of any surveillance of correspondence. 
The court apparenily discounted the state's 
argument that because visits were limited 
to a relatively small number of approved 
persons, they presented less of a security 
risk. 
The Supreme Court has passed on the 
closely related question of the first amend-
ment rights of those who correspond with 
convicted prisoners. Procunier· v. \Martinez, 
supra. There the Court held that censor- · 
ship of prisoner mail coul~ be no greater 
than necessary to the protection of the par-
ti cular governmental interest involved, se-
curity being one of the recognized state 
interests. 416 U.S. at 413, 94 S.Ct. 1800. 
The state here, however, asserts not a right 
to withhold mail but only the right to moni-
tor. Martinez clearly recognized such a 
power in prison officials as a necessary inci-
dent of exercising an appropriate censor-
ship function. Id. We do not believe the 
first amendment rights of those who corre-
spond with detainees, or of detainees .them-
selves, necessarily are any greater. Rather 
we concur with the Seven th Circuit, which 
recently observed: 
"We may take judicial notice of the fact 
that an opportunity for secret and 
lengthy communication between a detain-
ee and his friends or relatives would sub-
stantially enlarge his opportunity for suc-
cessful escape. We have no doubt that 
over the course of time some persons 
would take advantage of that opportuni-
ty." 
Smith v. Shimp, supra, 562 F.2d at 426. To 
the exten t N cw Hampshire disavows any 
intention of ;;c:111ning mail sent to counsel, 
public officials, or the news media, the sur-
veillance procedures employed were the 
same as those sustained in Shimp. We 
must permit thesi procedures here, and ac-
cordingly the portion of the district court's 
order concerning outgoing mail is reversed . 
On remand, the district court will be free to 
address the question, should it be necessary, 
of what steps might be required to ensure 
the l·,,nsorship practices at the Jail-i. e., 
the withholding of particular communica-
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4. Personal Belongings 
(12] The district court ordered Jail au-
thorities to prepare a list of personal prop-
erty that inmates could keep in their cells, 
using as its standard that in effect at the 
New Hampshire State Prison. The court 
held that equal protection mandated this 
ruling: 
"While plaintiffs may not have a con-
stitutional right to have a television or 
other personal property in jail, it is a 
constitutional requisite that defendants 
justify as absolutely necessary the rule 
that forbids all personal property at the 
Rockingham County Jail. I find it highly 
significant that the New Hampshire 
State Prison and another New Hampshire 
county jail allow inmates to have a varie-
ty of personal items, and it is unlikely 
that the introduction of such approved 
personal items at the Rockingham County 
Jail would create u·ndue security risks at 
that institution that are not posed at 
others. Further, denial of this privilege 
to Rockingham County Jail detainees con-
stitutes a denial of equal protection when 
both convicted inmates and pretrial de-
tainees at other ja\ls and prisons are per-
mitted to have approved personal items." 
The items held to be admissible inclllded 
televisions, radios, tape cassette players, 
clothing, food, and tobacco. The Jail offi-
cials protest that some of these items can be 
used as weapons or to start fires, while all 
of items facilitate the concealment of con-
traband by cluttering the cells and create a 
risk of conflicts among inmates by callsing 
property disputes. • 
Even as a comparison, the district court's 
argument was flawed inasmuch as it over-
loo ·cd differences in both the facilities and 
inm:- te populations at other institutions. A 
quantity of personal possessions that might 
be tolerable in one prison with larger cells 
might amount to intolerable clutter at the 
Jail. An inmate's need for a variety of 
personal effects might be greater at an 
institution where t 1e avcr:,ge stay was 
lengthy than at a local j ail wit h a high rate 
of turnover in its population . Furthermore, 
!ts we have indicated above, even if the 
comparison were a fair one, the contrast in 
the restrictions employed would only be evi-
dence of the possible arbitrariness of the 
Jail's total ban on personal property, but 
not conclusive. 
In light of the record now before us, we 
are unable to hold that a complete prohibi-
tion of personal belongings at the Jail 
would be reasonably related to the asserted 
state interests in security and order. At 
the same time, the list of approved items 
ordered by the court seems far too exten-
sive in light of the appropriate standard of 
review. Accordingly, we remand this ques-
tion to the district court to afford Jail offi-
cials an opportunity to determine in the 
first instance what personal items could be 
allowed in detainees' cells without unduly 
hampering the efforts of the officials to 
maintain order and security. 
5. Counsel at Disciplinary Proceedings 
(13] In place of the completely unstruc-
tured disciplinary program then in effect at 
the Jail, the district court substituted a 
system that incorporated published rules, 
advance written notice of charges, an im-
partial fact finder, power to call witnesses, 
and permitted a detainee to retain counsel. 
The defendan ts appeal only the last part of 
the order, arguing that the prei-ence of 
counsel exceeds the requirements of due 
process and imposes an unreasonable bur-
den upon the Jail. The court, to the con-
trary, found that the presence of counsel 
would not impose a burden to security and, 
to the extent such dangers were present in 
particular circllmstances, permitted exclu-
sion of counsel upon a showing by Jail 
officials that a security threat existed. 
The Supreme Court has addressed the 
counsel issue with regard to convicted pris-
oners. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 
94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the 
Court said: 
"[A]s we have indicated, the fact that 
prisoners retain rights under the Due 
rroccss Clause in no w·iy in.plies that 
these ril,hts: re not~, bj~ct to r<shictions 
impo~ed by the 1.ature of the regime to 
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ted. Prison disciplinary pro-
ceedings are not part of a criminal prose-
cution, and the full panoply of rights due 
a defendant in such proceedings does not 
apply. In sum, there must be 
mutual accommodation between institu-
tional needs and objectives and the provi-
sions of the Constitution that are of gen-
eral application." 
Id. at 556, 94 S.Ct. at 2975. With particular 
regard to the presence of counsel in prison-
er disciplinary proceedings, the Court ob-
served, 
"The insertion of counsel into the disci-
plinary process would inevitably give the 
proceedings a more adversary cast and 
tend to reduce their utility as a means to 
further correctional goals. There would 
also be delay and very practical problems 
in providing counsel in sufficient num-
bers at the time and place where hearings 
are to be held. 
"Where an illiterate inmate is involved, 
however, or where the complexity of the 
issue makes it unlikely that the inmate 
will be able to collect and present the 
evidence necessary for an adequate com-
prehension of the case, he should be free 
to seek the aid of a fellow inmate, or if 
that is forbidden, to have adequate sub-
stitute aid in the form of help from the 
staff or from a sufficic11 tly competent 
inmate designated by staff ." 
Id. at 570, 94 S.Ct. at 2981. 
Due process is i flexible concept, and the 
court must in each case focus on the com-
peting i11terests of the parties. 8cc Gagnon 
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 
36 L.Ed.2d 656 (]973); Doi.-:'ning v. LeBrit-
ton, 550 F .2d 689, 691 (1st Cir. 1977). We 
are not dealing here with criminal proceed-
ings. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 
316, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ecl.2<l 810 (1976). 
Looking to the state's interests , we note 
both the risk of delay and the heightened 
adversarial stance of the proceeding caused 
by the presence of counsel. Unlike the 
procedures involved in Baxter :-rnd McDon -
JJcll, no "correctional goals" as such arc 
implicated here, but the state 's very real 
interests in order and security are pre~ent 
to the same extent as in those cases. Con-
sequently, we cannot hold that detainees 
have a right to retain counsel in all \:ases, 
especially in light of the already elaborate 
procedural safeguards to which Jail officials 
have acceded. We do not believe that due 
process requires greater participation by 
counsel in these proceedings than that re-
quired by McDonnell and\ Baxter in the 
prisoner context, namely that those accused 
of disciplinary infractjons may obtain some 
form of legal counselling where illiteracy or 
the complexity of the issues makes it un-
likely the detainee will be able adequately 
to apprehend the case unassisted. We re-
mand this portion of the order to the dis-
trict court for appropriate modification. 
6. Transfers 
New Hampshire Revised Statutes Anno-
tated § 623:3 provides: 
"Transfer to State Prison. Any person 
who is confined awaiting trial on a felony 
charge, may be transferred to the state 
prison, from the county jail or house of 
correction, upon the recommendation of 
the sheriff, and with the approval of the 
county commissioners of said county." 
Before the district court's order in this case, 
Jail officials tra nsfcrred detainees pursuant 
t.o this sect ion whenever they believed 
transfer to be desirable. Among other pur-
poses, these transfers enabled the officials 
to relieve o\·ercrowding. The district court, 
however, held that the transfers occasioned 
subst antial hards:1ips for the transferees in-
asmuch as the conditions of confinement 
were in some respects more onerous at the 
state prison. The court distinguished two 
recent Supreme Court cases involving the 
due process rights of convicts transferred 
among prisons, Jfcachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 
215, 96 S.Ct. ?532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976); 
Mun t.anye ,·. Haymes, 427 U.S. 206, 96 S.Ct. 
25!3 , 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976), and held that 
various due process rights applied to such 
transfers. 
[14, 15] We do not agree that Meachum 
,.nd l\foni;rnJe are distinguishable. It is 
t rue that convicted prisoners have been con-
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that therefore the only liberty interests re-
tained that require the protection of due · 
process are those created by state law. But 
it is equally true that detainees also have 
been constitutionally confined for legiti-
mate state purposes. A mere relative wors-
ening in the conditions of this confinement 
does not trigger any constitutional interest, 
as long as the "nature and duration" of the 
new form of incarceration does not exceed 
the original purpose for which the detainee 
was committed, Jackson v. Indiana, supra, 
406 U.S. at 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845. And as the 
above quoted statute makes clear, plaintiffs 
have no claim grounded in state law to 
which due process may attach. According-
ly, we reverse the order of the district court 
inasmuch as it specified cert ain procedural 
prerequisites to transfer of detainees. 
The order of the district court is vacated 
a!!d remanded in part, and reversed in part. 
COFFIN, Chief Judge (dissen ting). 
The court's opinion, while obviously 
thoughtful and responsive to understanda-
ble concerns, seems to me to proceed from 
false constitutional premises and to reject 
virtually all of the case law affecting pre-
t rial detainees. The court begins , soundly 
enough, by recognizing that detainees have 
not yet been tried and found guilty and 
that current autho;ity allows their liberty 
to be taken "only to the extent necessary to 
ensure their presence at trial." When the 
anal:1 bis reaches its end, however, we find 
that only those restrictions which are inhu-
man, serve no proper purpose, or are arbi-
trary and capricious in that they " merely 
reflect the lack of imagination or energy of 
local officials" may be judicially corrected. 
The path the court t .. kes is the following : 
(1) encroachment on a detaince's liberty is 
permitted only if necessity requires it; (2) 
orderly and secure prisons are necessary to 
assure the detainee's presence at trial; (3) 
deference to local aut 10rity requires that a 
state need meet only a minimal burden to 
establish the nexus between the treatment 
, of detainees and the goals of prison securi-
ty. Therefore, the state may impose on 
pretrial detainees my condition of confine-
ment that it can reasonably relate to its 
institutional concerns for safety and order 
in the prison where they are incarcerated. 
Through this logic the "necessity" of the 
court's initial principle is transformed to 
include the farthest limits of administrative 
rationality. \ 
I appreciate some of the implicit and ex-
plicit premises which have led the court to 
this conclusion. There i~ a clear lack of 
commitment on the part of the body politic 
to provide significantly increased funding 
for correctional facilities. Courts in gener-
al and federal courts in particular are natu-
rally reluctant to intrude into the adminis-
tration of state and local government activ-
ity. While pretrial detainees are presump-
tively innocent of the charges against them, 
they may well be dangerous individuals 
who pose security risks for custodial author-
ity. 
Indeed, the court's formu lation and anal-
ysis wou ld comport perfectly with a consti-
tution that guaranteed that "no citizen may 
be deprived of his liberty without due proc-
ess of law except for encroachments 
deemed by legislative or administrative 
judgments to bear a reasonable relationship 
to legitim ate societal interests." Such a 
guarantee would ue entirely coherent; it 
would respect majoritarian decisions as to 
funding priorities, support institutional effi-
ciency, and minimize federal court intru-
sions in state and local affairs. But this is 
not our constitution. 
Nor docs the overwhelming majority of 
the many courts which have considered the 
rights of pretrial detainees so view the con-
stitution. I attempt to marshal the author-
ities below. But before considering these, I 
do not wish to a'fipc ar to do a disservice to 
the authorities relied on by the L:ourt. Per-
haps most pertinently the court, in suggest-
ing a new standard with which to evaluate 
conditions of confinement of pretrial de-
tainees, quotes , upreme Court language 
tha t "'At the least, due l ,ocess requires 
that the nature and duration of commit-
ment bear some reasonable relation to the 
purpose for which the indiYidual is commit-
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(92 S.Ct. 1845, 1858, 32 L.Ed.2d 435] (1972)." 
The context in which that quotation is tak-
en from in Jackson, a case involving the 
indefinite commitment of a person incompe-
tent to stand trial, makes it clear that the 
Court was referring to the nature of the 
proceeding through which a state may in-
carcerate a person indefinitely and that the 
proceeding in question had not met the 
most minimal standards of due process. 
The case says nothing about conditions of 
confinement or the standards under which 
they should be evaluated. 
I have found only three pretrial detainee 
cases which appear to provide support for 
the majority's standard. Seale v. Manson, 
326 F.Supp. 1375 (D.Conn.1971) focused on 
the rights of two particular detainees, both 
of whom were accused of serious criminal 
offenses. However, it is clear that the rea-
sonable relation standard utilized in Scale is 
no longer the law of .the Second Circuit, see 
Rhem V. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336-37 (2d 
Cir. 1974); Detainees of Brooklyn House of 
Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 
397 (2d Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. 
Wolfish v. Levi, 406 F.Supp. 1243, 1247 
(S.D.N.Y.1976). 
The second case, Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 
998 (7th Cir. 1976), appears to present sev-
eral standards, one of which, "that as a 
matter of due process, pre trial detainees 
may su ffer no more restrictions than are 
rcasomi bly necessary to ensure their pres-
ence at trial", is consistent with the court's 
opinion in the present case. Other lan-
guage in Duran suggests a more protective 
view of detainee's rights. The opinion spe-
cifically permits detainees to present evi-
<len,·e as to whether Uwir privileges can be 
increased "without jeopardizing the securi-
ty of the institutions or requiring unreason-
able expenditures." A later Seventh Cir-
cuit case strongly suggests that depriva-
tions imposed on pretrial detainees must 
recc ive snme sort of rigorous scrutiny. In 
Smith v. Shimp, 562 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 
1977), the <.:ourt discusses Duran without 
ever mentioning a "reasonably necessary" 
standard. Instead, it staks that "if conflict 
betw(;cn t11e state's interest in jail securi ty 
a1,d tJ,e civi l liberties of the detainees can-
not be avoided or limited by reasonable 
means, the latter must yield." Id. at 426. 
This rule simply states the obvious- that 
the courts will not uphold unreasonable de-
mands on the part of detainees and that 
there must be rational limits on their civil 
liberties if custody is to be maintained. It 
does not indicate that any "reasonable" 
deprivation imposed by the state will be 
upheld irregardless of whether sufficient 
security and order could be maintained by 
less restrictive means. Indeed, the court 
states this specifically, "We may ,.assume 
that the defendants' practice would be un-
constitutional if the interest in jail security 
could be protected by less burdensome 
means." Id. at 426. 
The third case, Main Road v. Aytch, 565 
F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1977), does not detail a 
specific standard with which to evaluate the 
conditions of confinement of pretrial de-
tainees, but it does suggest that prison au-
thorities should be given considerable defer-
ence in their attempts to maintain security 
in prisons both for convicted prisoners and 
pretrial detainees alike. It is difficult to 
tell how much of the court's analysis was 
meant to apply to general conditions of 
confinement of pretrial detainees and how 
much of it was limited to the facts of the 
particular case being adjudicated. The 
Third Circuit was confronted with a mixed 
plaintiff class of pretrial detainees and con-
victed criminals (although the large majori-
ty were detainees); the district court had 
found that governing the two groups under 
separate regulations would not be feasible; 
detainees did not receive fewer privileges 
than their convicted counterparts; and 
while the privilege sought in the suit, the 
right to hold group press conferences, was 
denied, other forms of communication with 
the press such as mail and individual inter-
views were permitted. To tue extent that 
the Third Circuit would extend cqui, alent 
deference to prison authorities whether 
they were holding convicted criminals or 
pretrial detainees in custody in most cir-
cumstances, not simply those described 
above, it provides support for the court's 
n ,inion in the prci:ent case. 
I would not c' · · 
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ble relationship" test. In any event, the at the least, the state cannot provide its 
almost universal state of authority is in pretrial detainees with less tolerable condi-
stark di sagreement with the court's analy- tions of confinement and privilege.s than it 
sis. Indeed, the rigorous standard of scruti- makes available to convicted criminals. 
ny described by the district court below has United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 
been approved in both its aspects. Depriva- F.2d 823, 827 (3d Cir. 1976);- Rhem v. MaJ-
tions may be imposed on detainees for legit- colm, supra, 507 F.2d at 336; Campbell v. 
imate purposes such as institutional securi- McGruder, 416 F.Supp. 100 (D.C.D.C.1975); 
ty only if such deprivations are justified by Martinez Rodriguez v. Jim enez, supra, 409 
"compelling necessity", see, e. g., Detainees F.Supp. at 593; Miller v. Carson, 401 
of Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. F.Supp. 835, 839, 864 (M.D.Fla.1975); Dil-
Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975); Jard v. Pitchess, supra, 399 F.Supp. at 1235; 
Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. In mates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisen-
1974); Martinez Rodriquez v. Jimenez, 409 sladt, supra, 360 F.Supp. at 686; Smith v. 
F.Supp. 582 (D.P.R.1976); United Stales ex Sampson, supra, 349 F.Supp. at 272; Conk-
rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 406 F.Supp. 1243, 1247 Jin v. Hancock, 334 F.Supp. 1119, 1121- 22 
(S.D.N.Y.1976); Manicone v. Cleary, 74 C. (D.N.H.1971). 
575 (E.D.N.Y.1975); Brenneman v. Madi- This "rule" has the benefit of appealing 
gan, 343 F.Supp. 128, 138-39 (N.D.Cal. simplicity , but it is open to the serious criti-
1972); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F.Supp. 93 cism that it proYides tooiow a floor for the 
(N.D.Ohio 1971) ("absolute requisite" in- rights of cletainees. See Brenneman v. Ma-
stead of compelling necessity), aff'd sub digan, supra, 343 F.Supp. at 137-40; Hamil-
nom., Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th ton v. Love, supra, 328 F.Supp. at 1191; 
Cir. 1972), or if the deprivation is the least Jon es v. Wittenberg, supra, 323 F.Supp. at 
restrictive alternative available to maintain 100. This seems obvious on a theoretical 
order and security, see, e. g., Miller v. Car- ]eye]. While the detainee has lost the right 
son, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977); Smith v. to be a fully free citizen, he has not been 
Shimp, 562 F.2d at 426 (7th Cir. 1977); found guilty of an offense for which he 
Rhem v. Malcolm, supra, 507 F.2d at 337; may be punished by constitutionally appro-
Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F.Supp. 886 (N.D. priate procedures. Since no one seriously 
Florida 1976); United Stales ex rel. Wolfish maintains that prisons for convicted crimi-
v. Levi, supra, 406 F.Supp. at 1247; Mani- nals arc solely cu::-to<lial and devoid of puni-
cone v. Cleary, supra; Dilfard v. Phchess, tirn dimensions, to equate the conditions 
399 F.Supp. 1225 (C.D.Cal.1975); ,Cudnik v. under which a detainee may be confined 
Kreiger, 392 F.Supp. 305 (N.D.Ohio 1974); with those imposed on a convicted criminal 
Wilson v. Beame, 380 F.Supp. 1232, 1236 is irrational and unfai r. The more appro-
(E.D.N.Y.1974); Inmates of Suffolk County priate analogy would be to equate the 
Jail V . . 'iscnsladt, 360 F.Supp. 676 (D.Mass. treatment of a detainee with that of a 
1973); .'~mith v. Sampson, 3,19 F.Supp. 268, bailee with the obYious proviso of the addi-
271 (D.N.H.1972); Brenneman v. Madigan, tional deprivations necessary to safely keep 
supra, 343 F.Supp. at 138; Hamilton v. the detainee in custody. See, e. g., Patter-
Love, 328 F.Supp. 1182 (E.D.Ark.1971); son v. Morrisette, 564 F.2d 1109 at 1110 (4th 
Palmigiano v. Tral'isono, 317 F.Supp. 776 Cir. 1977); Detainees of Brooklyn House of 
(D.R.I.1970). Dcf Pntiun fur .Uen v. Jfalcolm, supra, .520 
The compelling ncc,'ssi ty st:rndard is of- F :2d at :397; JLrtinez RodrigllcZ v. Dime-
ten derived from an equal protection analy- nez, supra, 409 F.Supp. at 594; Jfillcr v. 
sis , while the concept of least rc$lrictive C:i.rson, supra, 401 F.Supp. at 856-57; Cud-
alternative is rooted in due process doctrine. nik v. Kreiger, supra, 392 F.Supp. at 331 ; 
However, regardless of their doctrinal !::mates of .Ui!lraukce Collnty Jail v. Pcler-
,ource the two standards te nd to mel d to- su1, 353 F.Supp. 1157, 1160 (KD.Wis.1973). 
380 570 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Unfortunately, the vision of constitution-
al theoreticians must be tempered by harsh 
realities. It is one thing to say that pretrial 
detainees may not be punished as courts 
have repeatedly held, see Mitchell v. Un-
treiner, supra, 421 F.Supp. at 894; Miller v. 
Carson, supra, 401 F.Supp. at 839-40, 867; 
Dillard v. Pitchess, supra, 399 F.Supp. 1232, 
1234; Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. 
Eisenstadt, supra, 360 F.Supp. at 685- 86; 
Inmates of Milwaukee County Jail v. Peter-
sen, supra, 353 F.Supp. at 1160; Brenneman 
v. Madigan, supra, 343 F.Supp. at 136; 
Conklin v. Hancock, supra, 334 F.Supp. at 
1191; Jones v. Wittenberg, supra, 323 
F .Supp. at 100; it is quite another to insist 
that such a principle be rigidly enforced. It 
would be impos~ible, without playing fast 
and loose with the English language, for a 
court to examine the conditions of confine-
ment under which detainees are incarcerat-
ed, even after extensive judicial relief, and 
conclude that their custody was not puni-
tive in effect if not in intent. Yet there are 
practical limits to the scope of remedial 
relief available to the courts which make 
such results unavoidable. 
If courts did not look to the conditions of 
confinement of convicted criminals, they 
would be adrift between two almost limit-
less absolutes. The major reason that de-
tainees are subject to harsh conditions of 
confinement has nothing to do with safety 
requirements. It is because society has not 
made avai lable sufficient funds to provide a 
safe and comfortable custodial env ironment 
for them. Indeed, once a detainee has been 
incarl·erated to guaran tee his presence, 
there would seem to be no justification, 
other than lack of fu nding, for denying him 
any of the anwni ti rs of life; given enough 
rr , 011n ·s 2lmost any privil<,ge can be given 
detaint es consistent with prison security 
concerns. Thus, one reason for courts look-
ing to the treatment of convicted criminals 
for guidance is that it gives them som e 
gen11 al sense of minimally accept,,hle con-
diti .. n~ of confinemen t which soci,•ty is \I ill-
ing to , 11pport. 
T e other reason is that almost any depri-
vation can be hplained or defended by the 
ju. t'fication that it impro\'CS the secur ity of 
a jail or prison. By looking to security 
arrangements in other prisons, the courts 
can better evaluate claims that the denial 
of a privilege is essential to security. If 
other institutions make that privilege avail-
able to their inmates without suffering any \ 
significant adverse consequences, courts 
should reject the unsubstantiated view of 
prison authorities that the privilege <iS a 
security risk. In effect the existence of a 
privilege in another prison facility raises a 
presumption that it may be offered detain-
ees without jeopardizing institutional secur-
ity. That presumption may be rebutted, 
but only by clear and convincing evidence. 
By using the rule that detainees must be 
treated at least as well as convicted crimi-
nals, courts limit their discretion and a void 
the temptation of imposing value judg-
ments on society that are not mandated by 
the constitution.' This is the very result the 
court's opinion insists a more deferential 
standard is necessary to achieve. The rule 
is unfair to detainees under any abstract 
theory of justice. It permits the innocent 
to be punished, the accused to be lumped 
together with those adjudged guilty by a 
court of law. Still if applied as a strict 
minimum with the benefit of the doubt 
given to the detainees , I believe it is the 
most practical, workable, and just rule that 
courts can develop at this time. 
Of course the rule has its defects and it is 
to some extent subject to manipulation. 
Howcn·r, if it is applied in the spirit de-
scribed above , these problems can be sur-
~ mounted. For example, it is argued that 
legislatures may simply reduce the quality 
of conditions of confinement across the 
board to the lowest common denominator. 
First of all , they could certainly take such 
action under a lesser stan<lard; and an ab-
solute standard may stifle progressive flexi-
bility in an effort to prevent potential back-
slid ing. Second, there is no indication that 
legislatures have rC'sponded in this manner 
in rPaet inn to judi<:ial eom,nands that condi-
tions for detainees be improved . Indeed, 
many states have not appealed at a ll or 
appealed only a small part of the remedies 
ordered by courts. Third, courts are not 
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expected to apply the standard in a tempo-
ral or geographical vacuum. If a privilege 
existed and was not a threat to institutional 
security in the past, there is no reason to 
assume it will be a problem in the future 
simply because it is no longer offered to the 
convicted criminal population. Similarly, if 
a privilege can be safely offered in a major-
ity of the states, courts should require hard 
evidence as to why it would create safety 
problems in a particular institution. 
Another problem and one rai sed by the 
court's opinion is that comparisons between 
the detainee population and the criminal 
population are inexact as to safety needs. 
This may indeed be the case. A detainee 
awaiting trial for murder may be more of a 
threat and require more stringent security 
precautions than a convicted ca r thief. I 
harbor no illusions that the detainee popula-
tion may not include serious security ri sks, 
although I might also note that many de-
tainees differ from bailees solely in their 
inability to finance their freedom by post-
ing bail. However, just as correctional sys-
(, ms routi nely differen tiate bet ween mini-
mum, medium, and max imu m security risks 
among convicted cr iminals, there is nothing 
to stop them from making similar distinc-
t ions, if supported by ev idence, between 
detainees. Not all det ainees need be t reat-
1~d alike . What is unacceptable is imposing 
restraints reserved for maximum security 
risks on the entire population of detainees 
sim ply because they are clet ainees. 
F inally, it may be argued t hat differences 
in the physical struct ure of different pris-
ons make an exact comparison of pri,·ileges 
a poor guide by which to evaluate ,security 
requi rements. To some exten t th is is true. 
I believe a court could take accou nt of these 
differences by grouping privileges for co m-
parison. Thus , if the structure of one pris-
u1 limited t he number of visitors tha t cou ld 
safely be accommodated, it cou ld expand 
some other associat ional or communication 
priv il ege such as telephone access to com-
I ensate fo r more limited Yisi t ing hours. 
lfowt;vcr, what is totally unal'l', ptable is 
the \'iew that one 11Lt;dkfs d,·pri,ation c:rn 
be used to j ustify a further 1ltpri,ati n. 
Thus, ill the instan t case detainees are 
housed in abysmally small rooms approxi-
mately 7' X 5 ' in size. There is no justifi-
cation based on institutional security needs 
to account for these conditions of confine-
ment. Yet the court argues that because 
their rooms are smaller than the rooms 
available to convicted criminals, detainees 
may not be permitted to have as many or 
similar personal belongings as convicted 
criminals because such belongings might 
"clutter" their rooms. Under this form of 
analysis, the only floor to the ctnditions of 
confinement imposed on a detainee would 
be gross inhum anity. I believe the contrary 
to be the case. If the physical structure of 
a particular jail is such that there is no way 
that privileges routinely offered to convict-
ed criminals can be made av ailable to pre-
trial detainees, the constitution prohibits 
the sta te from incarcerating detainees in 
that facility. 
Applying the standards I suggest to the 
particular issues on appeal in the present 
case, I would disagree with the court's con-
clusions on most but not all of them. On 
some issues, while I believe the di strict 
court may have gone further than the con-
stitution requires, I would argue that the 
plaintiffs are entitled to greater relief than 
the majority here would permit. On other 
issues I would affi r m the rlistrict cou rt's 
ana lysis and conclusions in thei r entirety. 
Howe\'er, since the standard of evaluation I 
contend the constitution requires has not 
been adopted by the court, I see little point 
in detai ling exactly how my standard's ap-
plit'ation would differ from the ~ ]together 
,liffL rLnt ., ,w ly~is of my Lrothers. The fo-
cus of my dissent is the ba:;ic framework of 
pre t rial detainee rights, not the nuances of 
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.JUSTICE w ... .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
Memorandum to the Conference 
Re: No. 77-1829, Bell v. Wolfish 
I have several conceptual 
memorandum in this case: 
7 March 1979 
(1) The definition of punishment that it sets out on pages 
15-16 appears to me too narrow.!/ Conspicuously absent, 
for example, is the question of whether the "affirmative 
disability or restraint" in question causes actual harm 
--physical or mental-- to pretrial detainees. Surely such 
an inquiry is at least relevant to the issue of whether a 
particular restraint constitutes punishment, and 
especially so in the context of imprisonment, which has 
itself "historically been regarded as a punishment." See 
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 233-234 (1896). 
1. I would prefer to lodge the right of an unconvicted 
man to be free from punishment in the presumption of 
innnocence. I see the presumption as something more than a 
mere evidentiary doctrine. I view it, as did Stack v. 
Boyle, 242 U.S. 1, 4 (1951), as a shield that "serves to 
prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction." 
The cases cited in Bill's memorandum, of course, merely 
establish that the presumption of innocence has 




The criterion of actual injury seems to be implied, 
although never made explicit, by the memorandum's language 
at p. 20. 
(2) After designating the criteria for determining whether 
a measure is punitive, Bill's memorandum does not even 
make the attempt to apply these criteria tti the security 
measures discussed in Part III. Seep. 24 n.27. I agree 
that the security and management of the MCC are legitimate 
government interests. But the government may not 
effectuate these interests in a manner that punishes 
pretrial detainees. Bill's memorandum fails to ask whether 
the security measures discussed in Part III constitute 
punishment. Indeed, Part III seems to abandon as 
irrelevant one of the key criteria used in the citation 
from Mendoza-Martinez. Bill states that comparisons 
between security measures in different institutions are 
legally irrelevant, see pp. 32, despite Mendoza-Martinez's 
statement that "whether [a restriction] appears excessive 
in relation to the alternative purpose assigned" is a 
criterion by which it is to be determined whether the 
restriction constitutes punishment. How one could 
.. 
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determine whether a measure is "excessive" without asking 
whether other institutions accomplish the same purpose 
with less restrictive means is a mystery to me. 
(3) The memorandum correctly observes that deference in 
matters of administrative expertise should be granted to 
prison officials, even in the context of pretrial 
detention. Whether administrative or security measures 
constitute punishment, however, is a legal question, with 
respect to which a similar deference is not appropriate. 
Bill's memorandum blurs this distinction at footnote 23, 
which states: 
In determining whether restrictions or conditions are 
reasonably related to the government's interest in 
maintaining security and order and operating the 
institution in a manageable fashion, courts must heed 
our warning that "[s]uch considerations are peculiarly 
within the province and professional expertise of 
corrections officials •..• "Pell v. Procunier, 417 
U.S., at 827 
Whether the security measures at issue in this case are 
"reasonably related" to the government's "interest in 
maintaining security and order and operating the 
-4-
institution in a manageable fashion," is crucial to 
determining whether they constitute punishment under the 
Due Process Clause. Indeed to determine whether security 
or administrative measures are punishment, Bill's 
memorandum, borrowing from Mendoza-Martinez, would have us 
ask (a) whether security and effective management are 
•alternative purposes" assignable to these measures, and 
(b) whether these measures are excessive in relation to 
these purposes. If, in answering these questions, the 
Court defers to the administrative expertise of prison 
officials in the "wide-ranging" manner suggested by Bill's 
memorandum, p. 25, these officials will in effect be 
determining what is punishment under the Constitution. 
This is an unacceptable abdication of this Court's 
responsibility to protect pretrial detainees from 
punishment. This abdication is not justified by the 
deference due to the "Legislative and Executive Branches," 
p. 26, since the protection of citizens from punishment 
prior to conviction is the example par excellence of the 
necessity of an independent judicial bulwark against 
unconstitutional encroachments of these two Branches. 
-5-
These three difficulties with Bill's memorandum lead 
me to an alternate view of the case. I agree with Bill 
that the dispositive question is whether pretrial 
detainees have been subjected to "punishment." But 
especially in a prison, which is the traditional arena of 
punishment, there is the strong possibility that specific 
administ~ative measures may in fact constitute punishment, 
particularly when pretrial detainees are mingled with 
convicted inmates. Thus to determine whether a specific 
measure constitutes punishment, a court must careful~y 
balance several factors, including the purported purpose 
of the measure, alternative methods of achieving that 
purpose, the administrative and fiscal justifications for 
the measure, and the harm caused by the measure. As we 
have long recognized, this is an "extremely difficult and 
elusive" endeavor, Mendoza-Martinez, at 168, in which 
several factors are "all relevant to the inquiry, and may 
often point in differing directions." Id., at 169. It is 
not an inquiry we can resolve in the abstract by invoking 
the talisman "deference." The application of the factors 
we decide upon, therefore, is a job to be entrusted to the 
• • 
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good sense of federal judges, and not one for this Court 
except to the extent of correcting abuses as they arise. 
The application of this view of the case leads me to 
quite different results than those reached by Bill: 
(1) I would remand to the district court the 
provisions discussed in Part III A, B, C, and D of Bill's 
memorandum, for appropriate findings in light of these 
considerations.~/ 
(2) Courts that have enjoined double-bunking have 
generally found that overcrowding causes "physical and 
psychological damage" to detainees. Such harm is relevant 
to whether overcrowding constitutes punishment. The double 
bunking issue was decided below on summary judgment, 
however, and neither side was able to create a factual 
record as to the extent of harm caused detainees by 
double-bunking in this particular facility. I would 
therefore remand as to this issue. 
2. Although my own view of the prohibition against 
receipt of hardback books except if mailed directly from 
publishers, book clubs, or bookstores, is that it violates 
the First Amendment and is thus impermissible whether or 
not it constitutes punishment, I would be willing to hold 
this judgment in abeyance pending reconsideration by the 
District Court as to whether this provision constitutes 
punishment under the Due Process Clause. 
W.J.B.Jr. 
.§uprmt.t QJouri of tlft~h .§hrltg 
Jhur~ J. QJ. 2llffe'!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
Re: No. 77-1829, Bell v. Wolfish 
Dear Bill, 
March 7, 1979 
Although I originally had considerable doubt about 
the "publisher-only" rule under the First Amendment, you 
have· dealt with it in III A of your Memorandum in such a way 
that I can acquiesce in it. In all other respects I agree 
with your Memorandum and shall join it if and when it be-
comes an opinion. 
I have read with interest John's comments -- par-
ticularly his views as to what constitutes "punishment." 
This is a question that I wrestled with a good many years 
ago in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 201. I 
came to the conclusion that while certain practices are un-
questionably "punishment," i.e. whipping or hanging somebody 
up by his thumbs, others may or may not be depending almost 
entirely upon the purpose behind them. Thus, denationali-
zation is punishment in some cases and is not in others, and 
the test is the purpose for which it is imposed. Similarly, 
in the case now before us, incarceration in the MCC is 
clearly punishment for those who are there as a result of 
conviction on criminal charges, and yet incarceration in the 
identical facility is clearly not punishment for those who 
are there as pretrial detainees • . In short, I think that 
John's proposed test, while an inviting one, is contrary to 
our precedents. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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C H AMBERS O F" 
JUSTICE JOHN P A UL STEV E N S 
.:§upunu <!}utttt o-f ~ ~b .;§tau,g 
,.-as-Jrittghtn. ~ . QI. 20-ffeJl., 
Re: 77-1829 - Bell v. Wolfish 
De ar Bill: 
Your memorandum does an excellent job of stating the 
facts fairly and outlining the issues. I agree wi th your 
basic premise that the quest i on concerning pretrial 
detainees is wb_ether tfiey are being subjected to 
punishment. I am, however, presently i ncl i ned to disagree 
w1 Eh your conclusions in these respects: 
J) AJthough I think you are probabJ y correct wi th 
respect to double celling, I believe the correct 
procedure would be to remand to the District Court to 
decide the issue under the proper standard rather than 
for this Court to make the initial determination. I 
also would try to define the punjshment standard 
somewhat differently--giving Jess emphasis to intent 
and more to the question whether a practjce invades 
the basic dignity of an individual who has not yet 
been convicted of any crime. 
2) With respect to the four practices discussed 
in Part III, I think it does amount to punishment to 
deny an innocent person the right to read a ook 
loane o 1m y a r1en or re a 1ve while he i_ s 
temporarily confined, to deny him the right to receive 
gifts or packages, to search his private possessions 
out of his presence, or to compel him to exhibit his 
private body cavities to the visual inspection of a 
prison guard. Absent probable cause to bel i eve that a 
specific individual detainee poses a special security 
risk, I do not be li eve any of these practices would be 
reasonable i f the pretrial detainees were conf i ned in 
a facil i_ ty separate and apart from convicted 
prisoners. If reasons of conven i ence justify 
- 2 -
intermingling the two groups, it is not too much to 
require the prison administrators to accept the 
additional inspection burdens that would resuJt from 
denying them the right to subject innocent citizens to 
these humiliating indignities. 
~ 
A standard of "punishment" is admittedly difficult to 
articulate. I am persuaded, however, that a principal 7 t.../ ingredient must be the violation of the dignity of the , IVb 
individual. Accordingly, although I agree that the MCC 
rules are all valid as applied to convicted prisoners, I 
would invalidate the four rules discussed in Part III as 
applied to pretrial detainees. 
Respectfully, , . 
;~ l ,, 
I 
I 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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Memorandum of Mn. JusTICE REHNQUIST. 
Over the past five Terms, this Court has in several decisions 
considered constitutional challenges to prison conditions or 
practices by convicted prisoners.1 This case requires us to 
examine the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees-those 
persons wlio have been charged with a crime but who have 
not yet been tried on the charge. The parties concede that 
to ensure their presence at trial, these persons legitimately 
may be incarcerated by the Government prior to a deter-
mination of their guilt or innocence, see infra, at 12-13 and 
n. 15, and it is the scope of their rights during this period 
of confinement prior to trial that is the primary focus of this 
case. 
This lawsuit was brought as a class action in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
to challenge numerous conditions of confinement and prac-
tices at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC), a fed-
erally operated short term custodial facility in New York 
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1 See, e. g , Hutto v. Pinney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978); Jones v. North Caro- ~~· 
lina Prisoners' Labor Union , 433 U. S. 119 (1977); Bounds v. Smith, 430 
U. S. 817 (1977); Meachum v. Pano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976); Wolff v, _J _ 
McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974) ; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); .• A .. 
1 
~ _..,1 J...._ _ 






BELL v. WOLFISH 
District Court, in the words of the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, "intervened broadly into almost every facet 
of the institution" and enjoined no fewer than 20 MCC 
practices on constitutional and statutory grounds. The Court 
of Appeals largely affirmed the District Court's constitutional 
rulings and in the process held that under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, pretrial detainees may "be 
subjected to only those 'restrictions and privations' which 
'inhere in their confinement itself or which are justified by 
compelling necessities of jail administration.'" Wolfish v. 
Levi, 573 F. 2d 118. 124 (1978), quoting Rhem v. Malcolm, 
507 F. 2d 333, 336 (CA2 1974). We granted certiorari to 
consider the important constitutional questions ra.ised by these 
decisions and to resolve an apparent conflict among the 
circuits.2 - U. S. - (1978). We now reverse. 
I 
The MCC was construct<'d in 1975 to replace the converted 
waterfront garage on West Street that had served as New 
York City's federal Jail since 1928. It is located adjacent to 
the Foley Square federal courthouse and has as its primary 
objective the housing of persons who are being detained in 
custody prior to trial for federal criminal offenses in the 
United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern 
Districts of New York and for the District of New Jersey. 
In addition to pretrial detainees, the MCC also houses some 
convicted inmates who are awaiting sentencing or transporta-
tion to federal prison or who are serving generally relatively 
2 Ser, e. g., Norris v. Prame, - F . 2d - (CA3, filed Oct . 31, 1978) 
(Ko. 78-1090), Campbell v. Magruder, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 580 F . 
2d 521 (1978) ; }Vo/fish ,·. Levi. 573 F. 2d 118 (CA2 1978); Feeley v. 
Bampson, 570 F. 2d 364 (CAI 1978); Main Road v. Aytch, 565 F. 2d 54 
(CA3 1977) ; Patterson v. Morrisette. 564 F. 2d 1109 (CA4 1977); Miller 
v. Carson, 563 F 2d 741 (CA5 1977) ; Duran v. Elrod, 542 F . 2d 998 (CA7 
1976). 
17-1820--M~O 
BELL v. WOLFISH 3 
short sentences in a service capacity at the MCC, convicted 
prisoners who have been lodged at the facility under writs of 
habeas corpus ad prosequendum or ad testificandum issued to 
ensure their presence at upcoming trials, witnesses in protec-
tive custody and persons incarcerated for contempt.8 
The MCC differs markedly from the familiar image of a 
jail; there are no barred"c'ells, dank, colorless corridors, ~r 
flanging steel gates. It was intended to include the most 
advanced and innovative features of modern correctional 
@sig_n. As the Court of Appeals stated: "[I] t represented 
the architectural embodiment of the best and most progressive 
penological planning.'' 573 F. 2d, at 121. The key design 
element of the 12-story structure is the "modular" or "unit" 
concept, whereby each floor designed to house inmates has one 
or two largely self-contained residential units that replace the 
traditional cellblock jail construction. Each unit in turn has 
several clusters or corridors of private rooms or dormitories 
radiating from a central 2-story "multipurpose" or common 
room, to which each inmate has free access approximately 16 
hours a day. (See Appendix.) Because our analysis does not 
turn on the particulars of the MCC concept or design, we need 
not discuss them further" 
When the MCC opened in August 1975, the planned capac-
ity was 449 inmates, an increase of 50% over the former West 
Street facility. Id., at 122. Despite some dormitory accom-
modations, the MCC was designed primarily to house these 
inmates in 389 rooms, which orginally were intended for single 
3 This group of nondetainees may comprise, on a daily basis, between 40 
and 60% of the MCC pop11lat10n. United States ex rel. Wolfish v. United 
8tates, 428 F . Supp. 333, 335 (SDNY 1977). Prior to the District 
Court',; order, 50% of all MCC inmates spent less than 30 days at the 
Jac1lity and 73% le~8 than 60 day1<. United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi; 
439 F . Supp. 114, 127 (SDNY 1977). However, of the unsentenced 
detainees, over half ,;pent less than 10 days at the MCC, three-quarters 
were relea,;ed withm a month and more than 85% were released within 601 
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occupancy. While the MCC was under construction, how-
ever, the number of persons committed to pretrial detention 
began to rise at an "unprecedented rate." Ibid. The Bureau 
of Prisons took several steps to accommodate this unexpected 
flow of persons assigned to the facility, but despite these 
efforts, the inmate population at the MCC rose above its 
planned capacity within a short time after its opening. ·To 
provide sleeping spa.ce for this increased population, the MCC 
replaced the single bunks in many of the individual rooms 
and dormitories with double bunks.4 Also, each week some 
Dewly arrived inmates had to sleep on cots in the common 
areas until they could be transferred to residential rooms as 
space became available. See 573 F. 2d, a.t 127-128. 
On November 28, 1975, less than four months after the 
MCC had~peu~d, the named respondents uut1ated this action 
by filing m the District Court a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. 5 The District Court certified the case as -a class 
f Of the 389 residential rooms at the MCC, 121 had been "designated" 
for double-bunking at the time of the District Court's order. 428 F. 
Supp., at 336. The number of rooms actually housing two inmates, how-
ernr, never exceeded 73 and, of these, only 35 were rooms in units that 
housed pretrial detainees. Brief for Petitioners 7 n. 6, Brief for Respond-
ents 11-12 ; App. 33-35 (Affidavit of Larry Taylor, · MCC Warden, dated 
Dec. 29, 1976) . 
~ Tt appears that the named respondents may now have been trans-
ferred or released from the MCC. Sre United States ex rel. Wolfish v. 
Levi, 439 F. Supp., at 119. "This case belongs, however, to that narrow 
class of cases in which the termination of a class representative's claim does 
not moot the claim,, of the unnamed member,, of the class." Gerstein v. 
Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 110 n. 11 (1975); see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 
(1975). The named respondents had a case or controversy at the time the 
c0mplamt was filed and at the time the clas,, action was certified by the 
District Court pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, and there remains a 
live controversy between pctit10ners and the members of the class repre-
i,ented by the named rci,pondents . See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S., at 402. 
Finally, becau~e of the temporary nature of confinement at the MCC, the 
11,sues presented are, a;; in Sosna and Gerstein, ''capable of repetition, yet 
evading review.' ' 420 U. S .. at 110 n. 11; 419 U. S., at 400-401; see 
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action on behalf of all persons confined at the MCC, pretrial 
detainees and sentenced prisoners alike. 6 The petition served 
up a veritable potpourri of complaints that implicated vir-
tually every facet of the institution's conditions a.nd practices. 
Re~pondents ... char_g~d. inter alia, that they had been deprived 
of their statutory and constitutional rights because of over-
crowded conditions, undue length of confinement, improper 
searches, inadequate recreational, educational a.nd employ-
ment opportunities, insufficient staff and objectionable re-
strictions on the purchase and receipt of personal items and 
bMks.7 
Kremens v. Bartley, 431 ll. S. 119, 133 (1977). Accordingly, the require-
ments of Art. III are met and the case is not moot. 
6 Petitioners apparently never conte~ted the propriety of respondents' use 
of a wnt, of habeas corpus to challenge the conditions of their confinement, 
and petitioners do not raise that question in this Court. However, 
respondents did plead au alternative basis for jurisdiction in their 
"Amended Petition" m the District Court-namely, 28 U. S. C. § 1361-
that arguably provide~ juri:;diction. An<l, at the time of the relevant 
orders of the District Court 1u this case, jurisdiction would have been 
provided by 28 U. S. C. § 1:331 (a), aH amended, 90 Stat. 2721. Thus, 
we leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a 
wdt of habea;:-: corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, 
alS distinct from the fact or leugth of the confinement itself. See Preiser v. 
Rodriguez, 411 li. S. 475, 4~!9-500 (1973). See generally Lake Country 
Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reyional Planning Agency, - U. S. - (1979). 
Similarly, petitwners do not contest the District Court's certification of 
this case as a clas~ act10n. For much the lSame reasons as identified above, 
thne is no nred m this case to reach thr question whether Fed. Rule Civ. 
Proc. 23, providing fur clas:s actions, is applicable to petitions for habeas 
corpus relief. Accordingly, we expre:ss no opiuion as to the correctness of 
the District Court's action in this regard. See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 
U. S. 25, 30 (1976) , 
7 The Court of Appeal~ de:-icnbed the breadth of this action as follows: 
" Ao an md1cat1011 of thP :-1cope of tlm1 action, the amended petition also 
decried the inadequate phone srrvice; 'strip' searches; room searches outside 
the inmate's pre~encc; a prohibition against the receipt of packages or the 
use of personal typewriters; interference with, and monitoring of, Jlf'fSonal 
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Iii two opinions and a series of orders, the District Court 
enjoined numerous MCC practices and conditions. With 
respect to pretrial detaiuees, the court held that because they 
are "presumed to be innoceut and held only to ensure their 
presence at trial. 'any deprivation or restriction of . .. . rights 
beyond those which are necessary for confinement alone, must 
be justified by a compelling necessity.'" 439 F. Supp., at 124, 
quoting Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention v. Mal~ 
colm, 520 F. 2d 392, 397 (CA2 1975). And while acknowl~ 
edgiiig that the ·rights of sentenced inmates are to be measured 
by the different standard of the Eighth Amendment, the court 
declared that to house "an inferior minority of persons ... 
in ways found unconstitutional for the rest" would amount 
to cruel and unusual punishment. 428 F. Supp .. at 339.8 
Applying these standards on cross-motions for partial sum-
mary Judgment, the District Court enjoined the practice of 
housing two inmates rn the individual rooms 1:1,nd prohibited 
enforcement of the so-called "publisher-only" rule, which at 
the time of the court's ruling prohibited the receipt of all 
books and magazines mailed from outside the MCC except 
those sent directly from a publisher or a book club.~ After a 
trial on the remaining issues, the District Court enjoined, inter 
alia, the doubling of capacity in the dormitory areas, the use 
madequate clas:,nficat10n of J)fl80Hers; unpropcr treatment of non-Engli8h 
speaking inmateR; un~amtar~· conditions; poor ventilation; inadequate and 
un!lamtary food; the d('mal of furloughs, unannounc('d transfers; improper 
restrictionH on religious fref'dom; and an insufficiently trained staff." 573 
F. 2d, at 12:~ n. 7. 
8 While most of the Di8tric1 Court's rulmgs were based on constitutional 
grounds, the court a!Ho held that :,om(' of thC' actions of the Bureau of 
Prisons wl'rl' subject to review nuder the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) and were '·arbitrary and capricious" within the meaning of the 
APA. 4:39 F . 2d, at 122- 123, 141; seC' n. 11, infra. 
u The District Court al~o ('nJomed confo;cation of inmate property by 
prison official~ without supplymg a rrcr1pt and, except under Hpecified cir-
cumstanl'C'!:', the rrading and m:;pC'ction of inmatei:i' outgoing and incoming 
m.aiL 42~ F. Supp., .it 341-:344 Petitioners <;lo not ch.illenge these rulings, 
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of the common rooms to provide temporary sleeping accom-
modations, the prohibition against inmates' receipt of packages 
containing food and items of personal property, and the prac-
tice of requiring inmates to expose their body cavities for 
visual inspection following contact visits. The court also 
granted relief in favor of pretrial detainees, but not convicted 
inmates, with respect to the requirement that detainees remain 
outside their rooms during routine inspections by MCC 
officials.10 
The Court of Appeals largely affirmed the District Court's 
rulings, although it rejected that court's Eighth Amendment 
analysis of conditions of confinement for convicted prisoners 
because the "parameters of judicial intervention into ... 
conditions .. . for sentenced prisoners are more restrictive than 
m the case of pretrial detainees." 573 F. 2d, at 125.11 Ac-
10 The District Court also granted respondents relief on the following 
issues: classification of inmate;; and movt>ment between units; length of 
confinement; law library facilities; the commissary; use of personal type-
writers; social and attorney visits; telephone service; inspection of 
inmates' mail ; inmate uniforms; availability of exercise for inmates in 
administrative detention; food service; access to the bathroom in the 
visiting area; sprcial diets for M11slim inmates; and women's "lock-in,'' 
439 F. Supp., at 125-165. None of these rulings are before this Court. 
11 The Court of Appeals held that "[a]n institution's obligation under 
the eighth amendment is at an end if it furnishes sentenced prisoners with 
adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal 
safety." 578 F. 2d, at 125. 
The Court of Appeals also held that the District Court's reliance on the 
APA was erroneous. Seen. 8, supra. The Court of Appeal:; concluded 
that because thr Bureau of Pri~onti' enabling legislation vest;; broad dis-
cretionary powers in the Attorney General, the administration of federal 
prisons com;titutes " 'agency action . .. committed to agency di;;cretion by 
law'" that, 1s exempt from judicial review under the APA, at least in the 
absence of a breach of a specific statutory mandate. 573 F. 2d, at 125; 
see 5 U. S. C. § 701 (a) (2) . Because of its holding that the APA was 
inapplicable to this case , tlie Court of Appeals reversed the District 
Court's rulings that the bathroom m the visiting area mm,t be kept un-
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cordingly, the court remanded the matter to the District 
Court for it to determiue whether the housing for sentenced 
inmates at the MCC was constitutionally "adequate." But 
the Court of Appeals approved the due process standard em-
ployed by the District Court in enjoining the conditions of 
pretrial confinement. It therefore held that the MCC had 
failed to make a showing of "compelling necessity" sufficient 
to justify housing two pretrial detainees in the individual 
rooms. 573 F. 2d, at 126-127. And for purposes of our review 
(since petitioners challenge only some of the Court of Appeals' 
rulings). the court affirmed the District Court's granting of 
relief against the "publisher-only" rule, the practice of conduct-
ing body cavity searches after contact visits, the prohibition 
against receipt of packages of food and personal items from 
·outside the institution, and the requirement that detainees 
remain outside their rooms during routine searches of the 
rooms by MCC officials. 1d., at 129-132.12 
II 
As a first step in our decision, we shall address "double-
distance telephone service available to MCC inmates, that the MCC must 
maintain unchanged its preHent schedule for social visits, and that the 
MCC must take commissary requests every other ·day. 573 F. 2d, at 
125--126, and 11. 16. Respondents have not cross-petitioned from the 
Court of Appeals ' disposition of the District Court's Eighth Amendment 
and AP A rulings. 
12 Although the Court of Appeals held that doubling the capacity of the 
dormitories was unlawful, it remanded for the District Court to determine 
"whether any numbn of inmates in excess of rated capacity could be 
sUitably quartered within thf' dormitories." 573 F. 2d, at 128. In view 
of the changed conditions mmlting from this litigation, the court also 
remanded to the District Court for reconsideration of its order limiting 
incarceration of detainees at the MCC to a period less than 60 days. Id., 
at 129. The court reversed the District Court 'i; rulings that inmates be 
permitted to poo~e~s typewnters for their personal use in their rooms and 
that imnatrs not be reqmred to wear uniforms. Id., at 132-133. None of 





BELL v. WOLFISH 9 
bunking" as it is referred to by the parties, since it is a con-
dition of confinement that is alleged to violate only the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and no other specific 
guarantee of the Constitution. We will treat in order the 
Court of Appeals' standard of review, the analysis which we 
believe the Court of Appeals should have employed, and the 
conclusions to which our analysis leads us in the case of 
double-bunking. 
A 
The Court of Appeals did not dispute that the Government 
may permissibly incarcerate a person charged with a crime 
but not yet convicted to ensure his presence at trial. How-
ever, reasoning from the "premise that an individual is to be 
treated as innocent until proven guilty," the court concluded 
that pretrial detainees retain the 1 'rights afforded unin~r-
c~~ndividuals," and that therefore it is not sufficient that 
the conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees "merely 
comport with contemporary standards of decency prescribed 
by the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth 
amendment.n 573 F. 2d, a.t 124. Rather, the court held, the 
Due Process Clause requires that pretrial detainees "be sub-
jected to only those 'restrictions and privations' which 'inhere 
in their confinement itself or which are justified by ~OQ1pelling 
necessities of jail administration.'" Ibid., quoting Rhem v. 
Malcolm, 507 F. 2d, at 336. Under the Court of Appeals~ 
"compelling necessity" standard, "deprivation of the rights 
of detainees cannot be justified by the cries of fiscal neces-
sity, . .. administrative convenience, ... or by the cold comfort 
that conditions in other jails are worse." 573 F. 2d, at 124 
( citations omitted). The court acknowledged, however, that 
it could not "ignore" otir admonition in Procunier v. Martinez, 
416 U. S. 396, 405 (1974), that "courts are ill-equipped to 
dea.l with the increasingly urgent problems of prison adminis-
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to second-guess the expert administrators on matters on which 
they are better informed." 573 F. 2d, at 124.13 
Our fundamental disagreement with the Court of Appeals is 
that we fail to find a source in the Constitution for its com-
pelling i'lecessftx sta1~ rd.1 <t Both the Court of Appeals and 
the District Court seem to have relied on the "presumption of 
innocence" as the source of the detainee's substantive right to 
be free from conditions of confinement that are not justified 
by compelling necessity. 573 F. 2d, at 124; 439 F. Supp., at 
124; accord, Campbell v. Magruder, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 
580 F. 2d 521, 529 (1978); ·Detainees of Brooklyn ·House of 
18 The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational· Fund, Inc., as amicus 
curiae, argues that federal courts have inherent authority to correct condi-
tions of pretrial ronfinement and that the practices at issue in this case 
violate the Attorney General's alleged duty to provide inmates with 
"suitable quarters" under 18 U. S. C. § 4042 (2). Brief for the NAACP 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., at Amicus Curiae 22-46. 
Neither argument was presented to or passed on by the lower courts; nor 
have they been urged by either party in this Court. Accordingly, we have 
no occasion to reach them in this case. Knetsch v. United States, 364 
u. s. 361, 370 (1960) . 
14 As authority for its compelling necessity test, the court cited three of 
its prior decisions, Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F. 2d 333 (CA2 1974) (Rhem I); 
Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention v. Malcolm, 520 F. 2d 392 
(CA2 1975), and Rhem v. Malcolm, 527 F. 2d 1041 (CA21975) (Rhem JI). 
Rhem l 's support for the compelling necessity test came from Brenneman 
v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 142 (ND Cal. 1972), which in turn cited 
no cases in support of its statement of the relevant test. Detainees found 
support for the compelling neces~ity standard in Shapiro v. Thompson, 
;194 U. S. 618 (1969), Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971), Willwms v. 
]llinois, 399 U. S. 235 (1970), and Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 
(1960). But Tate and fVilliams dealt with equal protection challenges to 
imprisonment basPd on inability to pay fines or costs. Similarly, Shapiro 
concerned equal protection challenges to :;tate welfare eligibility require-
ments found to violate the constitutional right to travel. In Shelton, the 
Court held that a :;chool board policy requiring disclosure of personal asso-
ciationR violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment right,,; of a teacher. 
None of these cases support the court':; compelling necessity test. Finally, 
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Detention v. Malcolm, 520 F. 2d 392, 397 (CA2 1975); Rhem 
v. Malcolm, 507 F. 2d 333,336 (CA2 1974). But see Feeley v. 
Sampson, 570 F. 2d 364, 369 n. 4 (CAl 1978); Hampton v. 
Holmesbury Prisou Officials, 546 F. 2d 1077, 1080 n. 1 (CA3 
1976) . But the presumption of innocence provides no sup-
port for such a rule. 
The presumption of innocence is principally a.n evidentiary 
doctrine that allocates th<' burden of proof in criminal trials; 
it also may serv<' as au admonishment to the jury to judge an 
accused's guilt or innocence solely on the evidence adduced at 
trial and not on the basis of suspicions that may arise from 
the fact of his arrest, indictment or custody or from other 
matters not introduced as proof at trial. '1.'aylor v. Kentucky, 
436 U. S. 478, 485 ( 1978); see Estelle v. Williams, 425 U. S. 
501 (1976); In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970); 9 J. Wig-
more, Evidencf' ~ 2511 (3d ed. 1940). It is "au inaccurate, 
shorthand description of the right of the accused to 'remain 
iuactivc and secure, until the prosecution has taken up its 
burden and produced evidence and effected persuasion ... ' 
[; an] 'assumption' that is indulged in the absence of con-
trary evidence." Taylor v. Kentucky, supra, at 483-484, 
n. 12. Without question. the presumption of innocence plays 
an important role in our criminal justice system. "The prin-
ciple that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the 
accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and 
its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration 
of our criminal law." Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 
453 (1895). But it has no application to a determination 
of the rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before 
his trial has even b<'gun. 
The Court of Appeals also relied on what it termed the l 
"indisputable rudiments of due process" in fashioning its com-
pelling necessity test. We do not doubt that the Due Process 
Clause protects a detarnee from certain conditions and restric-
tions of pretrial detarnment See infra, at 13- 19. Nonethele.es, 
12 
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that clause provides no basis for application of a compelling 
necessity standard to conditions of pretrial confinement that 
are not alleged to infringe any other, more specific guarantee 
of the Constitution. 
It is important to focus on what is at issue here. We are 
not concerned with the initial decision to detain an accused 
and the curtailment of liberty that such a decision necessarily 
entails. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 114 (1975); 
United States v. Ma,rion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971). Neither 
responde11ts 11or the courts below question that the Govern-
ment may permissibly detain a person suspected of commit~ 
ting a crime prior to a formal adjudication of guilt. See 
Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, at 111-114. Nor do they doubt that 
the Government has a substantial interest in ensuring that 
persons accused of crimes are available for trials and, ulti-
mately, for service of their sentences, or that confinement of 
such persons pending trial is a legitimate means of furthering 
that interest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27; see Stack v. Boyle, 342 
U. S. 1, 4 (1951).15 Instead, ~ti§. a~e when an aspect 
of pretrial detention that is not alleged to violate any express 
guarantee of the Constitution is challenged, is the deta.inee's 
right to be free from punishment, see infra, at 13-14, and his 
desire to live as comfortably as possible during his confine-
ment, both of which may conceivably coalesce at some point. 
15 In order to imprison a person prior to trial, the Government must 
comply with constitutional rPquirements, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S., a.t 
114 ; Stack v. Boule, 842 U. S. 1, 5 (1951), and any applicable statutory 
provisions, e. g., 18 U . S. C. §§ :3146, 3148. Respondents do not. allege 
that the Government failed to comply with the ronstitutional or statutory 
requisitrs 1o pretrial detention. 
The only justifiration for pretrial detention asserted by the Govern-
ment 1s to ensure the detaineC's ' prt>seucC' at trial. Brief for Petitioners 43. 
Respondents do not que;;tion the legitimacy of this goal. Brief for 
Respondent8 33; Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. Wf>', therefore', have no occasion to 
Ponsider whether any othrr govemnwntal objectives may con:;;titutionally 
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It seems clear that the Court of Appeals did not rely on the 
detainee's right to be free from punishment, but even if it had 
that right does Hot warrant adoption of that court's compel-
ling necessity test. See 'infra, at 13-19. And to the extent the 
court relied on the deta.inee's desire to live comfortably, it 
suffices to say that this desire simply does not rise to the level 
of those fundamental liberty interests delineated in cases such 
as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 ( 1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U. S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923) . 
B 
In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or restric-
tions of pretrial detention that do not implicate a specific 
constitutional guarantee other than the Due Process Clause, 
we think that J,hJlproper inquir~ is ~ hether those e,,onditions 
amo nt to punishment of the detainee.16 For under the Due 
Process ause, a e amee may not be punished prior to an 
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.17 
16 The Court of Appeals properly relied on the Due Process Clause 
rathC>r than Eighth Amendment in considering the claims of pretrial 
detainee;,. Due proc('ss re(luire~ that a pr('trial d('tainee not be pnnished. 
A sentenred inmate, on the other hand, may be punished, although that 
punishment may not be "cnH'l and unusual" under the Eighth Amend-
me11t. The Court recogniz('d this distinction in Ingraham v. Wright, 430' 
U. 8. 651, 671-672, IL 40 (1!:177) : 
" Eighth Amendment scrutiny b appropriate only after the State has-
eomplied with the constitutional guaranties traditionally associated with 
eriminal prosecutions. See United 8tates v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 317-
:HS (1946) . . . . [TJhe Stat<' does not acquire the power to punish with 
which the Eighth Amendment il:! concerned until after it has secured a 
formal adjudiration of guilt in acrordance with due process of law. 
Where the State se<'ks to impo::;e puni"hment without such an adjudication, 
the J)Prtinent, eonstitutional guarantee i:; the Due ProcC>~ Clause of the· 
Fourteenth Amendment. ''. 
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See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651. 671-672 n. 40, 674 
(1977); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S.144, 165-167, 
186 (1963); Wong Wino v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 
(1896). A person lawfully committed to pretrial detention 
has not been adjudged guilty of any crime. He has had only 
a "judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite 
to [the] extended restraiut of [his] liberty following arrest." 
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S., at 114; see Virginia v. Paul, 148 
U. S. 107, 119 (1893). And, if he is detained for a susnected 
~l ~ 
violation of a federal law, he also has had a bail hearing. See 
18 U. S. C. ~~ 3146, 3148.1"- Undrr s uch circumstances, the 
Government concedely may detain him to ensure his presence 
at trial and may subject him to the restrictions and conditions 
of the detentio1i facility so long as those conditions and restric-
tions do not amount to punishment, or otherwise violate the 
Constitution 
Not every disability imposed during pretrial detention 
amounts to "punishment" in the constitutional sense, how-
ever. Once the Government has exercised its conceded au-
thority to detain a person pending · trial, it obviously is 
detainees to ca:'lt doubt on any historical exceptions to the gmeral principle 
that pumshment ran only follow a determination of guilt after trial or 
plea-exceptions such a~ the powf'r summarily to punish for contempt of 
court. See, e.g., Bluorn v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); United States v. 
Barnett, ;{76 U. S. 681 (1964), Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517 
1925) , Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289 (1888); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 42. 
is The Bail Reform Art of 1966 e,;tablii;hei; a liberal policy in favor of 
pretrial release. 18 U S C. §§ 3146, 3148. Section 3146 provides in 
pertinent part 
'Any person chargt•d with tlll offen~e, other than an offense pumshable 
by death, :,;hall, at h1,; appearance before a Judicial officer, be ordered 
released pf'ndmg trial on his per:;onal recognizance or upon the execution 
of an un~e<'ured appearancr bond in an amount specified b)' the judicial 
officer , unlf's~ tlw officer determinPs, in the exercise of his discretion, that 
such a relea,,e will not reasonably a;:sure the appearance of the 1Jerson as 
req111red ,. 
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entitled to employ devices that are calculated to effectuate 
this detention. Traditionally, this has meant confinement in 
a facility which, no matter how modern or how antiquated, 
results in restricting the movement of a detainee in a manner 
in which he would not be restricted if he simply were free 
to walk the streets pending trial. Whether it be called a jail, 
a prison or a correctional institution, the purpose of the facility 
is to detain. Loss of freedom of choice aud privacy are 
in~ent incidents of confinement in such -a facility. And the 
fact that sucii detention interferes with the detainee's under-
standable desire to live as comfortably as possible and with as 
little restraint as possible during confinement does not convert 
the conditions or restrictions of detention into "punishment." 
This Court has recognized a distinction between punitive 
measures that may not constitutionally be imposed prior to a 
determination of guilt and regulatory restraints that may. 
See, e. g., Kennedy V. Meiuloza-Martinez, supra, at 168; 
Flerning v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 613--614 (1960); cf. DeVeau 
v. Braisted, 363 U. S. 144, 160 (1960). In Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, supra, the Court examined the automatic 
forfeiture of citizenship provisions of the immigration laws 
to determine whether that sanction amounted to punishment 
or a mere regulatory restraint. While it is all but impossible 
to compress the distinction i11to a sentence or a paragraph, the 
Court there described the tests traditionally applied to deter-
mine whether a governmental act is punitive in nature: 
"Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability 
or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a 
punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding 
of scienter, whether its operation will promote the tradi--
tional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, 
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a 
crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may 
ratJonatly be connected is assignable for it, and whether-
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.it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose 
assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often 
point in differing directions." 372 U. S., at 168-169 
(footnotes ornitted) o 
Because forfeiture of citizenship traditionally had been con-
sidered punishment and the legisla.tive history of the forfeiture 
provisions "conclusively'' showed that the measure was in-
tended to be punitive, the Court held that forfeiture of 
citizenship in such circumstances constituted punishment that 
could not constitutionally be imposed without due process of 
law. Id., at 167- 170, 186. 
The factors identified in Mendoza-Martinez provide useful 
·guideposts in determining whether particular restrictions and 
·conditions accompanying pretrial detention amount to punish-
ment in the constitutional sense of that word. A court must 
decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of 
punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other 
legitimate governmental purpose. See Flemming v. Nestor, 
supra, at 613-617. w Absent a showing of an intent to punish 
on the part of corrections officials, that determination gen-
erally will turn on "[w]hether an alternative purpose to which 
[ the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for 
it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alter-
native purpose assigned [to it]." Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, supra, at 168-169; see Flemming v. Nestor, supra, at 
617. Thus, if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial 
detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental 
111 As Mr. Jm,tice Frankforter stated in United States v. Lovett, 328 
U. S. 303, 324 (1946) (coneurrmg opinion): "The fact tha.t harm is 
inflicted by governmental authority doc~ not. make ii. punishment.. Figura-
tively ~peaking all discomforting action may be dePmPd punishment because 
it deprives of wha.t. otherwi~e would be Pnjoyed. But there ma.y be reasons 
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objective, it does not, without more, amount to "punish-
ment." 2° Conversely, if a restriction or conditio11 is not 
reasonably related to a legitimate goal-if it is arbitrary or 
purposeless-a court permissibly may infer that the purpose 
of the governmental action is punishment that may not con-
stitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees. See 
Flemming v. Nest or, supra, at 617. 21 Courts must be mindful 
that these inquiries spring from constitutional requirements 
and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather 
than a court's idea of how best to operate a correctional 
facility. Cf. Un-ited States v. Lovasco, 431 U. S. 783, 790 
(1977); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,435 (1973). 
One further point requires discussion. The Government 
asserts, and respondents concede, that the "essential objective 
of pretrial confinement is to insure the detainees' presence at 
trial. " Brief for Petitioners 43; see Brief for Respondents 33. 
While this interest undoubtedly justifies the original decision 
to confine an iudividual in some manner, we do not accept 
respondent's argument that the Government's interest iri 
ensuring a detainee's presence at trial is the only objective 
20 This is nut to say that. corrrctious officials can justify punishment. 
They cannot. It is simply to say that in the absrnce of a showing of 
intent to puni:;h, a court must look to see if a particular restriction or 
condition, which may on its face appear to be punishment, is instead but 
an mcidmt of a lrgitimate gowrnmental objective. Ser Kennedy v. 
Mendoza.-Martinez, supra, at 168; Flemming v. Nestor, supra, at 617. 
Conversely, loading a drtainee with chains and shackles and throwing him 
in a dungeon may ensure his presence at trial and preserve thr security 
of th(' mstitution. But it would be difficult to conceive of a situa.tion 
where conditions ;;o har:sh, rmployed to achieve objective:s that could be 
accompli~hed in 80 many alt rrnntive and lrss harsh method:s, would not 
support a conelusion that the purpose for which they were imposed was 
·to punish. 
i.1 ''There i~, of course, n de rninimis level of imposition with which the 
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that may justify restraints and conditions once the decision is 
lawfully made to confine a person. "If the government could 
confine or otherwise infringe the liberty of detainees only to 
the extent necessary to ensure their presence at trial, house 
arrest would i11 the end be the 01ily constitutionally justified 
form of detention." Campbell v. Magruder, supra, at 529. 
The Government also has legitimate interests that stem from 
its need to manage the facility in which the individual 'is 
detained. These l'eg1famate operatiorial concerns may require 
aclmhus'trative measures that go beyond those that are, strictly 
speaking. necessary to ensure that the detainee shows up at 
trial. For exam1jle, the Government must be able to take 
steps to mai11tain security and order at ·the institution:22 
Restraints that are reasonably related to the institution's 
interest in maintaining jail security do not. without more, con-
stitute unconstitutional punishment. even if they are discom-
forting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have 
experienced had · he beeu released while· awaiting trial. We 
need not here attempt to detail the precise extent of the legit-
imate governmental interests that may justify conditions or 
restrictions of pretrial detention. · It is enough simply to 
recognize that in addition to ensuring the detainees' presence at 
trial, the effective management of the detention facility once 
the individual is confined is a valid objective that may justify 
imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention 
· and dispel any inference that such restrictions are intended as 
punishment.28 
22 Iu fact, srcurity mea~ure~ may directly serve the Government:s inter-
est in ensuring the detainee',; pre~rncc at trial. See Feeley v. Sampson, 
570 :F. 2d, at :369. 
2 ~ In determining whrt her restrictions or conditions are reasonably 
related to the govnnment 's interelit in maintaining security and order 
and operating the institution in a manageable fa;,hion, courts must heed 
our warning that ·· ro1 Inch contsideration~ are peculiarly within the province 
ai1d lJrofessional expPrti;,e of rorrections offi.cials1 and, in . tl1e absence of 
r .... ,...: 
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Judged by this analysis, respondents' claim that double-
bunking violated their due process rights fails. Neither the 
District Court nor the Court of Appeals intimated £hat "it 
considerectdouble-5unlung to constitute· unishment; instead, 
they found t at 1 contraveiie the compelling necessity test, 
which today we reject. On this record, we a.re convinced as a 
matter of law that double-bunking as practiced at the MCC 
did not amount to unconstitutional punishment and did not, 
therefore, violate respondents' rights under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
The rooms at the MCC that house pretrial detainees have 
a total floor space of approximately 75 square feet. Each of 
them designated for double-bunking, see n. 4, supra, contains 
a double bunkbed, certain other items of furniture, a wash 
basin and an uncovered toilet. (See Appendix.) Inmates 
generally a.re locked into their rooms from 11 p. m. to 6:30 
a. m. and for brief periods during the afternoon and evening 
head counts. During the rest of the day, they may move 
about freely between their rooms and the common areas. 
Based on affida.vits and a personal visit to the facility, the 
District Court concluded that the practice of double-bunking 
was unconstitutional. The court relied on two factors for its 
conclusion: ( 1) the fact that the rooms were designed to house 
only one inma.te, 428 F. Supp., at 336-337; and (2) its judg-
ment that confining two persons in one room or cell of this 
size constituted a "fundamental denial [] of decency, privacy, 
personal security, and, simply, civilized humanity .... " Id., 
at 339. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court. 
In response to petitioners' arguments that the rooms at the 
i;ubstantial evidence in the rpc·ord to indicate that the official:, have exag-
gerated their response to those considerations, courts should ordinarily 
defer to their expert judgment in "uch mattern." Pell v. Procunier, 417 
U. S., at 827; :;ee Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Unum, supra; 
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MCC were larger and more pleasant than the cells involved in 
the cases relied on by the District Court, the Court of Appeals 
stated : 
" [W]e find the lack of privacy inherent in double-celling 
in rooms inteuded for one individual a far more com-
pelling consideration than a comparison of square footage 
or the substitution of doors for bars, carpet for concrete, 
or windows for walls. The Government has simply failed 
to show any substantial justification for double-celling." 
573 F. 2d, at 127. 
'\Ve disagree with both the District Court and the Court 
of Appeals that there is some sort of "one man, one cell" 
principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendrnet1t. While confining a given number of people in a 
given amount of space in such a manner as to cause them to 
endure genuine privations and hardship over an extended 
period of time lYlight raise serious questions under the Due 
Process Clause as to whether those conditions amounted to 
punishment, nothing even approaching such -hardship is shown 
by this record ~1 
2• Re3pondPnts seem to argue that double-bunking was unreasonable 
because petitioner::; were able to comply with the bistrict Court's order 
forbidding double-u\mking :md ;;till accommodate tlw incrrased numbers 
of detaincPS simply by tranHfrrrinµ; nil but a handf\ll of i;rntenced inmates 
who had been assigned to the MCC for the purpo::;e of prrforming certain 
serv1l'es and cbtnmitting tho~e tasks to detainees. Brief for Rrspondents 
50 That prtitionpr,; were able to comply with the bistrict. Conrt's order 
in this fashion docH not meah that prtitioner's chosen method of coping 
with the increased inmate J'>OJ)Ulation-doubie-bunking--was unreasonable. 
Govrrnmental artioli. dor::; not. hav~ to be thr only alternative or even the 
best alternative for it to hr rra~onablr, to ::;ay nothing of con::;titntional. 
See Vance v. Bradley, - (T S. - (1979); lJandriclge v. Jifilliams, 397 
U. S. 471, 485 (1970) 
That petitJ.ouers were able to comply with the District Court order also 
does not make th1::; ea::;e moot, becau~r petitioner~ ~till dispute the legality 
of thr court'::; ordrr and thry havr informed the Court that there is a 
rea~onable expertat1on thin they may b<' rrquired to dol!lble-bunk again, 
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Detainees were required to spend only seven or eight hours 
each day in their rooms, duriug most or all of which they 
presumably are sleeping. The rooms provide more than ade-
quate space for sleeping.25 During the remainder of the time, 
the detainees are free to move between their rooms and the 
common area. While double-buuking may have taxed some 
of the equipment or particular facilities in certain of the com-
mon areas, United States ex rel. Wolfish v. United States, 428 
F. Supp., at 337, this does not mean that the conditions at 
the MCC' failed to meet the standards required by the Con-
stitution. Our conclusion in this regard is further buttressed 
by the detainees' length of stay at the MCC. See Hutto v. 
Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 686-687 (1978). Nearly all of the 
detainees are released within 60 days. See n. 3, supra. We 
simply <lo not believe that requiring a detainee to share toilet 
facilities and this admittedly rather small sleeping place with 
another person for generally a maximum period of 60 days 
violates the Constitutiou/6 
Reply Hrirf of Petitioner;; (i; Tr. of Oral Arg. 33-35, 56-57; i:;ee United 
States v. W. T. Grant Co., :345 U. S. 629, fi32-63:3 (1953). 
25 We thus fail to undrr::,tand the empha,;is of the Court of Appeals 
and the District Court on the amount of walking ;;pace in the double-
bunked roomH. Sre 573 F. 2d, at 127; 428 F. Snpp., at 337. 
2n Respondents' reliance on other lowrr rourt decisions concerning mini-
mum space requirement,- for different 1rn,titutions and on correctional 
staudard8 issurd b~· various groups is misplaced. 'Brief for Re,;pondents 
41, and rm. 40 and 41; i:;ee, e. g., Campbell v. Magruder, supra; Battle v. 
Anclei-son, 564 F. 2d 388 (CAlO 1977); Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 
1007 (SD Ohio 1977); Iurnatei; of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 
F . Supp. {i76 (Mass. 1973); American Public HPalfh Association, Stand-
ards for Hc'alth Services in Correctional Institutions 62 (1976); American 
Correctional Association, :Manual of Standard;; for Adult Correctional In-
shtut1011i:; 4142 (1977), Nat1011al Shrriff's AHsociation, A Handbook on Jail 
Architecture 63 ( 1975). Thr ca~e~ cited by respouclrnt:s concerned facili-
ties markedly different from the MCC. They involved traditional jails 
and C'ells in winch mmates were locked durmg mo;;t of the day. Given 
this factual cfo,panty , they have littlr or no application to the case at 
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Respondents also challenged certain MCC restrictions and - -.. 
practices that were designed to promote security and order 
at the facility on the ground that these restrictions violated 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and certain 
other constitutional guarantees, such as the First and Fourth 
Amendments. The Court of Appeals seemed to approach the 
challenges to security restrictions in a differe11 t fashion than 
the other contested conditions and restrictions. It stated that 
"once it has been determinrd that the mere fact of confine-
ment of the detainee justifies the restrictions, the institution 
must be permitted to use reasonable means to insure that its 
lrg-itimate interests in security are safeguarded.'' 573 F. 2d, 
at 124. The court might disagree with the choice of means 
to effectuate those interests, but it should not "second-guess 
the expert administrators mwnatters on which they are better 
informed . . . . Concern with minutiae of prison adminis-
tration can only distract the court from detached consideration 
of the one overriding question presented to it: does the prac-
tice or condition violate the Constitution'?" Id., at 124-125. 
Nonetheless, the court affirmed the District Court's injunction 
against several security restrict" s. The Court rejected the 
arguments o petitioners that these practices served the MCC's 
mterest in security and order and held that the practices were 
unjustified interferences with the retained constitutional rights 
of both detainees and convicted inmates. Id., at 129-132. In 
rea:soning and conch1sion~ of these ca;,;es. And whilf' the rf'commendations 
of the~f' variou:s grou])H may be in::;tructive in rertam ca:ses, they simply 
do not establish the ronstitutional mmima; rather, they establi:sh goals 
n'r·cmmended by the organization in que:stion. For this ;,;ame reason, the 
draft recommendations of the FrdPral Corrrct1ons Policy Task Force of 
thr Department of Justice regarding conditions of confinement for pre-
trial detainee;,; are not determmat1vt> of the requirf'ments of thf' Consti-
tution. See Dept. of Ju:;tire, Frderal Corrrctiom, Policy Task Force, Draft 
Federnl Standards for Correctwn:s (June 1978)_ 
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our view, the Court of Appeals failed to heed its own admoni-
tion not to "second-guess" prison administrators. 
Our cases have established several general principles that 
inform our evaluation of the constitutionality of the restric-
tions at issue. First, we have held that convicted prisoners do 
not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their 
conviction and confinement in prison. See Jones v. North 
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U. S. 119, 129 (1977); 
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215, 225 (1976); Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-556 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 
417 U. S. 817, 822 (1974). "There is no iron curtain drawn 
between the Constitution and the prisons of this country." 
Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, at 555-556. So, for example, our 
cases have held that sentenced prisoners enjoy freedom of 
speech and religion under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, see Pell v. Procunier, supra; Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 
319 (1972); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964), that they 
are protected against invidious discrimination on the basis of 
race under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, see Lee v. Washington, 390 U. S. 333 (1968), 
and that they may claim the protection of the Due Process 
Clause to prevent additional deprivation of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law, see Meachum v. Fano, 
supra; Wolff v. M cDorinell, supra. A fortiori, pretrial de-
tainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, retain all 
of the constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by 
convicted prisoners. 
But our cases also have insisted on a second proposition: 
simply because prison inmates retain certain constitutional 
rights does not mean that these rights are not subject to 
restrictions and limitations. "Lawful incarceration brings 
about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privi-
leges and rights, a rrtraction justified by the considerations 
underlying our penal system.'' Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 
266, 285 (1948); see Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor 
,, 
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Union, supra, at 125; Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, at 555; Pell 
v. Procunier, supra, at 822. The fact of confinement as well 
as the legitimate goals and policies of the penal institution 
limit these retained constitutional rights. Jones v. North 
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, supra, at 125; Pell v. 
Procunier, supra, at 822. There must be a "mutual accom-
modation between institutional 11eeds and objectives and the 
provisions of the Constitution that are of general application." 
Wolff v. M cDon11ell, supra, at 556. This principle applies 
equally to pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners. A de-
tainee simply does not possess the full range of freedoms of 
an unincarcerated individual 
Third, maintaining institutional security and preserving 
internal order and d1sc1pliue are essential oa s that may 
require limitation or re ract1011 of the retaiue<l constitutional 
rights of both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees. 27 
"Central to all other corrections goals is the institutional con-
sideration of internal security within the corrections facilities 
themselves.'' Pell v. Procunier, supra, at 823; see Jones v. 
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, supra, at 129; 
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 412 (1974). Prison 
" 7 NPither thP Court of Appeals nor thP District Court distingui:shed 
between pretnal detainPCS and convicted inmafr8 in reviewing the chal-
lengPd :secnnty practJCP~. and wr. SPP no rPason to do :,;o. ThPrc i:s no 
ba:sis for concluding that pretrial detainePs pose any lesser security risk 
thau convicted inmate•:,;. Indeed, it may be that in certain circumstances 
they pre:,;ent a great<·r mk to jail :security and ordPr . Sre, e. g., Main 
Road v. Aytch, 5f\5 F. 2d 54, 57 (CA:3 Hl77). Ju the federnl sy~t('m, a 
detainep i1; committed to the cl<'trntion facilit)' only because no other less 
drastic mean~ can reasonably assure hi:s presence at trial. See 18 U. S. C. 
§ 3146. A:; a rr;;ult, tho:,;P who arr drtainr<l prior to trial may in many 
case~ be individuals who ar<' chargrd with ~erious crimes or who have 
prior rrcords. Thry also may po~r u greater risk of escape than con-
vickd rnmatrs. St'<' ,Join1 App. (No . 77-20:35, CA2) 1:393-1:398, 1531-1532. 
This may be purt1c11larly trne at fa<'ilitie:,; like the ~1CC, whrrr tlw rr::-ident 
convicted inma1c:; haw lwrn ~eutrnced to only :;hort term"' of inrarcrrat.ion 
and many of the drtaim·rts face thr J>o:,;~ihility of leu_gthy unpn:sonment jf 
conv.ietNl 
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officials must be free to take appropriate action to ensure the 
safety of inmates and corrections personnel and to prevent 
escape or unauthorized entry. Accordingly, we have held that 
even when an institutional restriction infringes a specific 
constitutional guarantee, such as the First Amendment, the 
practice must be evaluated in the light of the central objective 
of 11riso11 administration, safeguarding institutional security. 
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, S'upra, at 129; 
Pell v. Procunier, supra, at 822, 826; Procunier v. Martinez, 
supra. at 412-414 
Finally, as the Court of Appeals correctly acknowledged, 
the problems that arise in the day-to-day operation of a cor-
rections facility are not susceptible of easy solutions. Prison 
administrators therefore should be accorded wide-ranging 
deference in the adoption and execution of policies and prac-
tices that in their Judgment are needed to preserve internal 
order and discipliue and to maintain institutional security. 
Jones v. l\"orth Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, supra, at 128; 
Procunier v. Martinez, supra, at 404-405; Cruz v. Beto, 405 
U. S .. at 321; see .Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S., at 228-229/8 
"Buch considerations are peculiarly within the province and 
professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the 
absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that 
the officials have exaggerated their response to these consid-
28 He,-;pondenis argue tlrnt thi~ Court'8 ca8e8 holding that 8Hb8tantial 
deference should be accorded prison officials arc not applicable to this-
case because tho8e dcci:-10n,- conrerned convictrd inmatr:::, uot pretrial 
dctamerH. Brief for He,-;pondrnt,- 52. We disagree. Those decision:,; held 
that court:,; should defrr to the informrd di:,;cretion of prison admini8trators 
becau8e the reaht1e:-; of ru11111ng a eorrrctions institution arc complex and 
difficult, court8 are 11l-e4uippl'd t.o drat with the:,;e problem,; and the' 
management of thesP facilities i:,; confided to the Executiw and Legi~lative· 
Branche~. not to tlw .Jud1c1al Bra11ch. Ser Jones v. North Carolina 
Prisoners' Labor Cmou, -1:3:3 l ' . S., at l'.:!6; Pell v. Procunier, 417 lT. S., at 
827 ; Procumer v. Martwl!z. -lW l l. S., at 404-405. WhilP tho:-;e cases each 
conceruecl restnct10ns gov(•rnmg ronv1ctPd mmatP:-, thr principle of 
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erations, courts should ordinal'ily defer to their expert judg-
ment in such matters." Pell v. Procunier, supra, at 827.2v 
We further observe that on occasion, prison administrators 
may be "experts" only by Act of Congress or of a state legisla-
ture. But judicial deference is accorded not merely because 
the administrator ordinarily will, as a matter of fact in a 
particular case, have a better grasp of his domain than the 
reviewing judge, but also because the operation of our correc-
tional facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legislative and 
Executive Branches of our Government, not the Judicial. 
Procunier v. Martinez, supra, at 405; cf. Meachum v. Fano, 
supra, at 229. \Vith these teachings of our cases iu mind, we 
turn to an examination of the MCC security practices that are 
alleged to violate the Constitution. 
A 
At the time of the lower courts' decisions. the Bureau of 
Prisons' "publisher-only'' rule, which applies to all Bureau 
facilities, permitted inmates to receive books and magazines 
from outside the institution only if the materials were mailed 
directly from the publisher or a book club. 573 F. 2d, at 
129-130. The warden of the MCC stated in an affidavit that 
~" What. thP Court ~aHI m Procu111er v. M artmez, supra. bra rs riepeating 
here : 
"Pri:son admm1:strator:, are re~pon~ible for maintaining internal order and 
discipline, for srruring their institution:,; against unauthorized acce:ss or 
escape, and for rrhab1htatiug, to thr extent that human nature and in-
adequate re~ourres allow, the inmate~ plac('d in their ru:stody. The Her-
culean ob;;tacles to ('ffectiv<' chscharg<> to these tlutie:; are too apparent to 
warrant explication. Suffice it to ~ay that the ptoblem~ of prisons in 
America are complex and mtraetable, nnd , more to the point. they are not 
read1!~ su~ceptible of re:;olution by decrP<'. ~lost require experti1,e, com-
prPhe1mvr plannmg and the comm1tmc•nt of re:;onrr~, all of winch are 
ppcuharly within thP provmrc' of 1 he lc•gi:,;latiw and rxecutive branches 
uf governmrnt. For all of tho~r rmson:s, court:; are ill rquippf'C! to deal 
with the rnrrra:smglr urgent problems of pn~on admirw,tration and reform. 
Judicrnl rrcognit1011 of that fact rrf!ect~ no more than a healthy :sense of 
reali.sm " 416 IJ S., at 404-405, 
'· 
77-1829--MEMO 
BELL v. WOLFISH 27 
"serious' ' security and administrative problems were caused 
when bound items were received by inmates from unidentified 
sources outside the facility. App. 24. He noted that in order 
to make a "proper and thorough'' inspection of such items, 
pri;on officials would 1iave to remove the- covers of hardback 
books and to leaf through every page of all books and maga-
zines to ensure that drugs, money, weapons or other contra-
band were not secreted in the material. "This search process 
would take a substantial and inordinate amount of available 
staff time." !bid. However, "there is relatively little risk 
that material received directly from the publisher or book 
club would contain contrabaml, and therefore, the security 
problems are significantly reduced without a drastic drain on 
staff resources. ' ' Ibid. 
The Court of Appeals reJected these security and adminis-
trative Justifications all<l affirmed the District Court's order 
enjoming enforcement of the "publisher-only" rule at the 
MCC. The Court of Appeals held that the rule "severely 
and impermissibly restricts the reading material available to 
inmates'' and therefore violates their First Amendment and 
due process rights. 573 F . 2d, at 130. 
It is desirable at this point to place in focus the precise 
question that now is before this Court. Subsequent to the 
decision of the Court of Appeals, the Bureau of Prisons 
amended its ''publisher-only" rule to permit the receipt of 
books and magazines from bookstores as well as publishers 
and book clubs. 43 Fed. Reg. 30576 ( July 17, 1978). In 
addition, petitioners have informed the Court that the Bureau 
proposes to amend the rule further to allow receipt of paper-
back books, magazines and other soft-covered materials from 
any source. Brief for Petitioners 66 n. 49, 69, and n. 51. The 
/ 
Bmeau regards hardback books as the "more dangerous source 
of risk to institutional security,' ' however, and intends to 
retain the prohibition against receipt of hardback books unless 
they are mailed directly from publishers, book clubs or book-
stores . ld., at 69 n. 51. Accordingly, petitioners request this 
•. 
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Court to review the District Court's injunction only to the 
extent it enjoins petitioners from prohibiting receipt of hard-
cover books that are not mailed directly from publishers, book 
clubs or bookstores. Id., at 69; Tr. of Oral Arg. 59-60.30 
We conclude that a prohibition against receipt of hardback 
books unless mailed directly from publishers, book clubs or 
books tores does not violate the constitutional ri hts of MCC 
inmates. That 1m1 e restriction is a rational response by 
p~ fficials to an obvious security problem. It ha.rdly 
needfl to be emphasized that hardba.ck books a.re especially 
serviceable for smuggling contraband into an institution; 
money, drugs and weapons easily may be secreted in the 
bindings. E. g., Woods v. Daggett, 541 F. 2d 237 (CAlO 
30 BecausP of the changes m the "publisher-only" rule, some of whir·h 
apparently occurred after we granted certiorari, rrspondents, citing Sanks 
, . Georgia, 401 U. S. 144 (1971), urge the Court to dismiss the writ of 
C'ert10rari a~ improvidrntly granted with respect to the validity of-the rule, 
as modified. Brief for Respondents 68. Sanks, howevrr, i:,; quite different 
from the im,tant cm,e. In Sanks the events that transpirPd after noting 
probable jurisdiction ·'had so dra~tically undermined thr premises on 
which we originally set [thr] case for plenary considrration a:,; to lrad us to 
roncludr that, with due regard for tlw proper functioning of thi::; Court, 
we should not .. . adJucliratP it. " Id .. at 145. Thr focus of that case 
had been "completely blurrrd, 1f not altogrthrr obliterated.'' and a judg-
ment on the issurs involvrcl had becomP "potPntially immatenal." Id., at 
152. This is not true herP. Unlike the »ituation in Sanks. the Govern-
ment has not substituted an rntirely different regulatory scheme and 
wholly abandoned the re::;trictions that were invalidated below. · There is 
still a disputr, which is not ''blurred" or ·'oblitcratPd," on which a judg-
ment will not be '·immatrr1al." Prtitioners have merely chosrn to limit 
their d1~agrrement with tlw lowPr courts' ruling:,; . Abo, the que8tion that is 
now posed i8 fairly compri~Pd within the que:;tions prn,ented in the Peti-
tion for Certiorari. Srr PPt. for CPrt. 2 ("Whether the governmental 
intere8t in maintammg Jail sPcurity and ordrr justifies rules that . . . 
(b) prohibit receipt at tlw JHil of books and magaziueH that are not ma1lecl 
directly from publisher~") . We , of cour~e, expre8::l no v1pw a:; to the 
validity of tho:,;e port10n8 of the lower coutt:,;' ruling:; that concern maga-
zines or ~oft-c<)vcr book:,; 
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1976). ~1 They also are difficult to search effectively. There 
is simply no evidence in the record to indicate that corrections 
officials have exaggerated their response to this security p~ob-
lem and to the administrative difficulties posed by the necessity 
of carefully inspecting each book mailed from unidentified 
sources. Therefore, the considered judgment of these experts 
must control in the absence of prohibitions far more sweeping 
than those involved here. See Jones v. North Carolina Pris-
oners' Labor Union, supra, at 128; Pell v. Procunier, supra, 
at 827. 
Our conclusion that this limited restriction on receipt of 
hardback books does not infringe the First Amendment rights 
of MCC inmates is influenced by several other factors. The 
rule operates in a neutral fashion, without regard to the 
content of the expression. Pell v. Procunier, supra, at 828. 
And there are alternative means of obtaining reading material 
that have not been show11 to be burdensome or insufficient. 
"We regard the available 'alternative means of [communica-
tion as] a relevant factor' in a case such as this where 'we 
[are] called upon to balance First Amendment rights against 
[legitimate] governmental ... interests.'" Id., at 824, quot-
illg Kliendienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 765 (1972); see 
31 The District Court stated, "With no record of untoward experience 
at places like the MCC, and with 110 history of resort to less restrictive 
measures, [petitioners'] invocation of security cannot avail wifo respect to 
the high constitutional interests here at stake." 428 F. Supp. , at 340. We 
rekcted this line of reasoning in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor 
Union, supra, at 132-133, where we stated, "Responsible prison officials must 
be permittrd to take reasouable ,;teps to forrs1all ... threat[s to security], 
and they mw;;t. be permitted to act before the t.ime when they can compile 
a dossier en the eve of a rio t." We reject it again, now. In Jones , we 
also emphasized that the "informed discretion of prison officials that there 
is potential. danger may he 1:mfficient for limiting rights even though this 
showing might be 'unimpre:;R1ve if . . submitted as justification for gov-
ernmmtal re8t rict ion of per::,onal communica1 ion among members of the 
geueral public.'" (Emphasis addPd.) Id., at 133 n. 9, quoting Pell v. 
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Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S., at 321, 322 11. 2. 1~he restriction. as 
it is now before us, allows soft bound books and maga:i:ines to 
be received from any source and hardback books to be received 
from publishers. bookstores and book clubs. In addition. the 
MCC has a "relatively large" library for use by inmates. 
United States e.r rel. Wolfish v. United States, 428 F. Supp .. 
at 340.'1" To the limited extent the rule might possibly in-
crease the cost of obtaining published materials. this Court 
has held that where "other avenues'' remain available for the 
receipt of materials by inmates, the loss of "cost advantages 
does not fundamentally implicate free speech values." See 
J0'/1es v. North ~cnrolina Prisoners' Labor ·Union, S'Upra, at 
130-131. We are also influenced in our decision by the fact that 
the rule 's impact on pretrial detainees is limited to a maxi-
mum period of approximately 60 days. See n. 3, supra. 1n 
sum, considering all the circumstances. we view the rule, as 
we now find it, to be a "reasonable 'time, place and manner' 
regulation [] . . . [. that is] necessary to · further significant 
governmental interests. . .. " Urayned v. City of Rock/ ord, 
408 U. S. 104, 115 (1972); see Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 
U. S. 569, 575-576 (1941); ·cox v. · Louisia:na, 379 U. S. 536, 
554-555 (1965); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 46-48 
(1966) . 
B 
Inmates at the MCC were not permitted to receive packages 
from outside the facility containing items of food or personal 
property, except for one package of food at Christmas. r.rhis 
:,~ The gpneral library consists of morC' than · 3,000 hardback books, 
which includr grncral reference' text,; and fiction and nonfiction works, 
and more· than 5,000 as;;;ortrd papPrbacks, including fiction and nonfiction. 
The MCC offers for salf' to inmates four daily newspapers iLnd certain 
magaziurH. Joint. App. (No. 77-2035, CA:!) 102-10:~ (Affidavit of Robert 
Harri:,;, \,ICC Ed11cat10n Sprf'1ah:-;t, dated Oct. 19, 1976). Other paprrback 
books and magazinr~ arp donatrd prriodirally and di:,;tributrd among the 
unit:,; for inm1110 ui'(e Unit,,(/ States er rel. Wolfi,~h v. Levi, 439 },. Supp.1 
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rull.' was .i~stifie<l by MCC officials on three grounds. First, 
officials tes ified to "serious" security profilems that arise from 
the introduction of such package's into the institution, the 
"traditional filP in thE' cake kind of situation" as well as the 
conc{'alment of drugs "in heels of shoes [and] seams of cloth-
ing.' ' A pp. 80; see id., at 24. 4-85. As in the case of the 
"publishE'r-011 ly" rule, the warden testified that if such pack-
ages wcrl.' allowed. the inspection prOC{'SS necessary to ensure 
the sE'curity of the institution would require a "substantial 
and inordinat<' amount of available staff tinw. ' ' Id., at 24. 
Second, officials W<'l'<' conc<'riwd that the introduction of per-
sonal property into tlw facility would increase the risk of 
thefts. gambling and i111natf' conflicts. the "age-old problem of 
you have 1t and 1 don 't. " Id. , at 80; sec id., at 85. Finally, 
they notNl storage' and sanitary problems that would result 
from rnmatE's' rE'ccipt of food packages. ld., at 67. 80. In-
mates are permittl.'d, however. to purchase certain items of 
food and p<'rso11al property from the MCC' conunissary.'1a 
The District Court dismissed these justifications as "dire 
prediction"-.'' It was unconvinced by thC' assE'rted security 
problC'ms becausP other institutions allow greater ownership 
of pl'rsonal property and receipt of packages than does the 
MC'C'. Ancl hC'causc' the MCC 1wrmittecl inmates to purchase 
items 111 the commissary. tlw court could not accept official 
fears of incrc1 ased theft, gambling or conflicts if packages trnre 
allowed. Finally. it believE'd that sanitation could be assured 
by propPr l10usekP<'prng regulations. Accordingly. it ordE'red 
the MC'C to prornulgat<:> regulatiolls to permit receipt of at 
least items of tlw kind that are available in the commissary. 
4;39 F . :,;iupp .. at 152- 1.)8. The Court of Appeals accepted 
the District Court's analysis and affirmed. although it noted 
that th e MCC C'ould place a cPiling on the permissible dollar 
"1 JmnatC'~ an· pt•rm111l'd to ~[)<'IHI a total or !-;)5 pPr wt·C'k or up to ~50 
ptr month nt tlw L'Oltlllll~~:H \' ( '111t ed State.~ f.t rel. ll'olfish \ IA' l' i, 439 
F. Supp , :it rn1. 
32 
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value of goods received and restrict the number of packages. 
573 F. 2d, at 132. 
Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals iden- I 
tified which provision of the Constitution was violated by this 
MCC restriction. We assume. for present purposes, that their 
decisions were based on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, which provides protection for convicted prisoners 
and pretrial detainees alike against the deprivation of their 
property without due process of law. See supra, at 23. But 
as we have stated, the due process rights of prisoners and 
pretrial detainees are not absolute; they are subject to reason-
able limitation or retraction in light of the legitimate security 
concerns of the institution. 
We think the District Court and the Court of Appeals have 
trenched too cavalierly into areas that are pro erl the con-
cern o o · cia s. is plain from their opinions, that 
the lower courts simply disagreed with the judgment of MCC 
officials about the extent of the security interests affected and 
the means required to further those interests. But our deci-
sions have time and again emphasized that this sort of un-
guided substitution of judicial j tidgment for that of the expert 
prison a.dministrators on matters such as 'this is inappropriate. 
See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, supra; 
Pell v. Procunier, supra, Procunier v. Martinez, supra. We 
do not doubt that the rule devised by the District Court and 
modified by the Court of Appeals may be a reasonable way of 
coping with the problems of security, order and sanitation. 
It simply is not. however, the only constitutionally permissible 
approach to these problems. Certainly, the Due Process 
Clause does not mandate a "lowest common denominator" 
security standard, whereby a practice permitted at one penal 
institution must be permitted at all institutions. 
Corrections officials concluded that permitting the introduc-
tion of packages of personal property and food would increase 
the risks of gambling, theft and inmate fights over that which 
~ .. 
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the institution a1rf'ady experienced by permitting certain itrrns 
to hr purchased from its commissirry. "Tt is enough to say 
that they have not bern conclusive1y shown to be \\'rong i11 
'this vit-w.'; Jones v. :\'orth Carolina Prisoners' Labor Fnio11, 
·supra, at 1:32. Tt is also all 'too 6bvious that such packages 
-are 'handy devic'l.'s for ·£he smuggling of contraband. 'Then' 
·simply is ·110 basis in this ,·econ] for cmieluding 'that MCC 
officials have exaggerated flwir response to these serious prob-
lems or that this restriction is irrational. It does not there-
fore violate the rights of convictccl inmates or of pretrial 
detarnees :iJ under the Due Process C'1ause of the ·'Fifth 
Amendment. 
C 
The MC'C' staff conducts unannounced searches of imnatP 
liviHg areas at irregular ilitervals. These searches generally 
are- formal u11tt" "snakedo,rng-L' during whicl1 a.11 inmates a-re 
cleared of the residential units, and a team of guards searcl1es 
each room. Prior to the District Courts' order, inmates were 
not permitted to watch the s0arc'l1C's. Dfficials testified that 
permitting inmates to observe room inspections would lead to 
friction betweeu the inmates and security guards and would 
allow the inmates to attempt to frustrate the search by dis-
tracting personnel and moving contraband from one room to 
another ahead of thf' search team."" 
~ 1 With rt>gard to prrtnal d!:'taine<'R, W<' again 11otr 'tliat thi~ rf'~triction 
affedi; thrm for gf'HPrall~· a maximum of GO da~·~. SPP 11. :J, supra. 
8 ~ Oll(• of I hP correcl 1ona1 expert,; I r,;tifietl a~ follow~: 
' . . the rpquiremrnt 1 hat pri~onrr~ nol h<' in the imnwdintr nrea obviously 
lias its fia:,;i:,; agam in t11C' rr4uirc-nwnts of sc·eurit~·. 
''It i1S quitP obviou~ tlrnt if a group of officN:s ,;tart a :,;earrhing proc•p,;,; or 
a hou:,;i11g arra at tl1P \.ICC, if 11 bP a rorr1<lor or au arrn of room,; or in 11 
lyp1ral jail if it wrrr a cell blo<'k, unh·~" all prisonPrs arp rrmoved from 
that nnmediate arPa, tlwrP are n w1<lP vanetr of 011portu11itiP~ for lhe 
<'Ot1fisrat1on of routraband by priso11rr:s who may han• ~urh in their 
J)OIS:SPISISion and C'Plk 
"11 ran go down the to1lc,1 or 0111 tlw window, .swallowPcl, a w1dr variety 
of mPtllud1S of confo;cation of C'ontraband." AJ>lJ. 7.':,,. 
34 
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The District Court hel<i that this procedure could not stand 
as applied to pretrial d(;)tainees because MCC officials had not 
showu that the restriction was .i ustified by "compelling neces-
sity.'' ~0 The court stated that "[a]t least until or unless 
[petitioners-I can show a pattern of violence or other disrup-
tions taxing the powers of colltrol-a kind of showing not 
ren:10tely approached by the W ar<len 's expressions-the security 
argument for banishing irnnates while their rooms are searched 
must be rejected." 439 F. Supp .. at 149. It also noted that 
in many iustaHces inmates suspected guards of thievery. - Id., 
at 148-149. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District 
Court. It saw "no reason whatsoever not to permit a de-
tainee to observe the search of his room and belongiugs from 
a reasonable distance.'' although the court permitted the 
removal of any detainee who became "obstructive." 573 F. 
2d. at 132. 
The Court of Appeals <lid not identify the constitutional 
provision on which it relied ill invalidating the room search 
rule. The District Court stated that the rule infringed the 
detainee's interest in privacy and indicated that this interest 
in privacy was founded 011 the Fourth Amendment. 439· F . 
• upp., at 149-150. It may well be argued that a person con-
fined in a corrections facility has no reasonable expectation 
of privacy with respect to his room or cell and that therefore 
the Fourth Amendment provides no protection for such a 
person. Cf. Lanza v. New York, 370 U. S. 139. 143-144 
(1962). In any case. given the realities of institutional con-
finement, any reasonable expectation of privacy that a detainee 
retained necessarily would be of a diminished scope. Id., at 
143. Assuming, arguendo, that a pretrial detainee retains such 
a diminished expectation of privacy after commitment to a 
&a The Dbtrict Comt rhd not rxtt-nd its rulinJ!: to eouvicted inmatrs 
becau~e, for tlwm, "the a~:-ertPd nC'ressitir:,; need not be 'romrwlling,'" and 
since the warden's expla11at1011 of thr problem8 po:,;ed wa~ "certainly not 
weightlr,,::;," the practice• passed the colls(itutional test .for .·m1tence<l 
innlittf's, 4:39 F Suw, at 11)0 
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corrections facility, we nonetheless find that the room search 
rule does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
It is difficult to see how the detainee's interest in privacy is 
infringed by the room search rule. No one doubts that room 
searches represent an appropriate security measure and neither 
the District Court nor the Court of Appeals prohibited such 
searches. And even the most zealous advocate of prisoners' 
rights would not suggest that a warrant is required to conduct 
such a search. Detainees' drawers and beds and personal items 
may be searched, even after the lower courts' rulings. Per-
mitting detainees to observe the searches does not lessen the 
invasion of their privacy; its only conceivable beneficial effect 
would be to prevent theft or misuse by those conducting the 
search. The room search rule simply facilitates the safe and 
effective performance of the search which aU concede may 
be conducted. The rule itself, then, does not render the 
searches "unreasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.87 
D 
Inmates at all Bureau of Prisons facilities, including the 
MC'C, are required to e~ ose their body caviti.:.,s for visual 
inspection as a part of a strip sear,ih conducted after every 
contact visit with a person from outside the institution.88 
87 It, ma,y br that ,-onw guard" have nhused the trust repo:;ed in them by 
failing to treat tlw per,,orrnl pos:;el:',-ions of inmate;; with appropriate 
rN11wet. Hnt, ev<'n a~:;unung that in :;ome iuHtances these abu;;e,; of trust 
reached thr lrvrl of constitutional violation:-:, thi~ is not an action to recover 
damagr,; for dnmagr to or dP:;truction of particular itrm,, of property. 
'!'hi~ i,; a rhalkngr to thr room Rearch rnlr in its entir<>ty, and the lower 
('OUrtR havr Pnjoinrd <·nforerment of the practicr it:;elf. Wheu anal)·zed in 
thi~ r-ontrxt, proper defrrpnc·e to the informed cli:,,crrtion of prison authori-
t i('H demand,; that, tlw)·, and not tht• court~, make the difficult judgments 
wh1<'h reronrilr coufl1riin1,t claim" affrcting the Hecurit)· of the in,;t.itution, 
the welfare of the prison 8taff, and the property righb of the detainees . 
.!011e,~ v N ol'th Carolina Prisoner~· J,abor Union, supra, at 128. 
8' If t]l(' mmatP i~ a male, he 111118t lift his genitalH and bend over to 
·vrcad hi~ but tork, for ,·i,;m1l m~1H'ctio11o The vaginal and nnal c,a,vities 
86 
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CorrC'ctions officials testified that visual cavity searclws were 
necessary not only to discovC'r but also to deter the smug-
gling of wc>apons. drugs aud othC'r contraband in to the insti-
tution. App. 70-72. 83-84. The District Court upheld that 
strip search procedure but prohibitPd the body cavity sc>arches. 
ahsc>11t probable cause to believe that the inmate is concealing 
c011traband. 439 F. Supp .. at 147-148. Because petitioners 
provC'd only 011P instance 111 th<:' MCC's short history where 
contraband was found during a body cavity search. the Court 
of Apprals affirmed. In its viPw. thC' "gross violation of 
pC'rsonal privacy inherent in such a search cannot be out-
wrip;hed by the gover1rnwnt's SC'curity interest in maintaining 
a pract1cr of so littl<:' actual utility." 573 F. 2d. at 131. 
AdmittC'dly. this practicC' instinctively _g_ives us the most 
paw,C'. Howev0r. assummg for prc>se11t purposes that inmates. 
b;th 'convicted prisoners an<l pretrial detainees. retain some 
Fourth Amendment rights upon commitment to a corrections 
facility. see Lanza v . .Yew }'ork, supra; Stroud v. United 
States, 251 FR. 15. 21 (HH9). we nonetheless conclude that 
these searches do not violate that Amendment. The Fourth 
Amendment prohibits only unrC'asonable searches. Carroll v. 
United States, 267 r. , . 132. 147 (1925). and under the 
circumstances, wc> do not believe that these searches are 
ui1rt.>asonable. 
The kst of rt"asonableness is not capable of precise defini-
tion or mC'chanieal application. In each case it requires -a 
balancmg of the 11ee<l for the particular search against the 
invasion of personal rights that tht> search entails. Courts 
must consider the scope of the particular intrusion. the man-
ner m which it is conducted, the Justification for initiatiHg it 
and the place in which it 1s conducted. E. y., United States 
v. Ramsey, 431 ( T. S. 606 (1H77); United States v. Marti11ez-
of l'PmalP inm:tt!·~ abo an• vi~twlly iu,,pedrd. Thr inmal<' i,, not touched 
by :-,rcunt.,· ppr:-,onnrl at au~· tml<' during t hr l't~ual ~Parch proecdurc. 
57;3 F 2d, :1t Ia!, Br1d of J>C't1t1011N'~ 70, ;:-1-:n.. b(t 
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Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
422 U. 8. 873 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); 
Katz v. United States, 389 U. R. 347 (1967); Schmerber v. 
California, 384 F. S. 757 (1966). A corrections facility is a 
unique place fraught with serious security dangers. Smuggling 
of money, drugs. weapons and other contraband is all too 
common an occurreuce. Aud inmate attempts to secrete these 
items into the facility by concealing them in body cavities are 
documeutecl in this record. App. 71-76, aud in other cases. 
E. g., Ferraro v. U'llited States, - F. 2d - (CA6, filed 
Dec. 15, 1978) (No. 78-5250); Un'ited States v. Park, 521 F. 
2d 1381, 1382 (CA9 1975). That there has been only one 
instance where an MCC inmate was discovered attempting to 
smuggle contraba11<l into the institution ou his person may be 
more a testameut to the effectivenPss of this search technique 
as a deterrent than to any lack of interest on the part of the 
inmates to SPcrete and import such items when the oppor-
tunity arises.30 
We do not underestimate tlw degree to which these searches 
3u Thr T>1:strn·1 Cour1 mdicated that in it~ virw the usr of metal detrr-
tion t>qu1pmrnt rppr<'~rnted a lP:,;R intru:,;ivP and Pqnall~· rffrctivc alterna-
tive to cavity i11,-pert10n;,;. We noted in Cnited States Y. J1artinez-l!'uerte, 
428 U.S. 54;~, 55(\-55i, n. 12 (l9i6), that ''ltJlw logic of such rlaboratt' 
les:s-rr:;trirtJve-altrrnatwe arg11me11tN could rai:;r in~uperable barrier;; to the 
rxrrr1i::ie of virtuallr all ~earch-and-sriz11rc powrr~." However, a;-;suming 
that the exil::!tl'nee of le~s intru,;ive altrrnutivrs i;; rrlcvant to the detrrmi-
nallon of thr rra~onablrnes~ of the particular ,;earch method at i;;sue, the 
aJternatiVl' i::!Ugl/:rsted b)· thr District Court simply would not be as effec-
tive Hi::! tlw vi:,unl insprction proc•p<lun'. Money, drug;;, aud othrr non-
mrtalhc contraband "till rould ea8ily hP ~m11gglrd into tlw institutiou. An-
other ])Oi::i"'iblr alternative>, not mrutio1wd by tlw lower court::,, would br to 
clm;el~, ob,;erve mmate VJ~itR . Sc·<> DPpt. of ,Ju;-;tic<', FPdrral Corrections 
Poliry Ta,;k forre, Draft FPderal Staudard~ for Corrections (.lune 1978). 
But :\[CC' offirntb havr adoptt>d the \'J:-mal m;;pectiou procedmc• a;; an 
,dternative to <"lo,;e and con,;1ant 1110111tori11g of co11tact visit;-; to avoid 
thr obv1011,; di::,ruptwn of the eonfidf'1tt1ality and intimacy that thrsc 
v1s1t;; are ,nt{•nded to afford. That rhoic<' ha,; not been shown to bo 
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may invade the personal privacy of inmates. Nor do we 
doubt, as the District Court noted, that on occasion a security 
guard may conduct the search i11 an abusive fashion. 439 F. 
Supp., at 147. Such abuse carn10t be condoned. The searches 
must be conducted in a reasonable manner. Schmerber v. 
California, supra, at 771-772. But we deal here with the 
questi011 whether visual body cavity inspections as contem-
plated by the MCC rules can ever be conducted on less than 
probable cause. Balancing the significant and legitimate 
security interests of the institution against the privacy inter-
ests of the inmates, we conclude that they cani10 
IV 
There was a time not too long ago when the federal judi-
ciary took a, completely "hands-off" approach to the problem 
of prison administration. In recent years, however, these 
courts largely have discarded this "hands-off'' attitude and 
have waded into this complex arena. The deplorable conditions 
and draconian restrictions of some of our Nation's prisons are 
too well known to require recounting here, and the federal 
courts rightly have condemned these sordid aspects of our 
prison systems. But many of these same courts have, in-the 
name of the Constitution, become increasi11gly enmeshed in 
the minutiae of prison operations. Judges. after all, are 
human. They, no less than others in our society, have a 
natural tendency to believe that their individual solutions to 
often intractable problems are better and more workable than 
those of the persons who are actually charged with and trained 
in the running of the particular institution under examination. 
But under the Co11stitut10n. the first question to be answered 
~0 We note that, ,-evrraJ low!:'r ro11rt~ havr upheld :such visual body 
c·av1ty m::;pection::; again::;t constitutional challenge. See, e. g., Da'Ughtery 
v Har1'ls, 476 F. 2d 292 (CAlO), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 872 (1973) ; 
Hodges v. Klein , 412 F . Supp. 896 (N.J 1976) ; Bijeol v. Benson, 404 F . 
Supp. 595 (SD Ind 1975) , Peun .El v. Riddle, a99 F. Suw. 1059 CED 
Va, 1975) . 
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is not whose plan is best. but in what branch of the Govern-
ment is lodged the authority to initially devise the plan? 
This does not mean that constitutional rights are not to be 
scrupulously observed. It does mean, however, that the in-
quiry of federal courts into prison management must be 
limited to the issue of whether a particular system violates 
any prohibition of thP Constitution, or in the case of a federal 
prison, a statute. The wirle range of "judgment calls" that 
meet constitutional and statutory requirements are confided 
to officials outside of the Judicial Branch of Government. 
The Judgment of the Court of Appeals is, accordingly, 
reversed and thr case is remanded for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
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APPENDIX* 
MCC mnltipurpose room . 
Double-bunked room hou"ing prrtrial drtainee><. 
*Photographs appended to Affidavit of David Hir:;ch, dat<'d Oct. 18, 
197G, fil('d in No. 75 Civ. fiOOO, SDl'\Y. 
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CHAMl!IE:RS OF' 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
,ltJTftm.t (!}irurl cf flrt ~tb ;%taus 
-as4inghttt. l-}. '4. 2llffeJ!' 
March 8, 1979 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 77-1829 Bell v. Wolfish 
/ 
With the difference in views expressed at the conference in 
this case, my memorandum did not, and I am quite sure could not, 
attempt to fashion some magic . elixir which would resolve all of 
these differences and produce a unanimous opinion for the court. 
I think that the major points raised by John and Bill in their 
memoranda of March 7th in response to my printed memorandum in 
this case represent basic differences of opinion as to the proper 
resolution of the constitutional questions presented by this 
case. But I do agree that they are quite correct in observing 
that the printed memorandum did not discuss the question of 
whether the security restrictions constitute "punishment", and 
that my memorandum probably should deal with that issue. The 
reason it did not was because both the District court and the 
court of Appeals examined these practices only in terms of the 
specific First and Fourth Amendment claims raised by the plaintiffs, 
•and in their briefs before this court the plaintiffs do not in 
- 2 -
general cast their attack on the security practices other than 
in terms of violations of the First and Fourth Amendments to 
the Constitution. 
But since my printed memorandum does analyze the "double 
bunking" issue in terms of punishment, and John and Bill both 
raise the question of whether these other practices might also 
constitute punishment, I agree that there should be a treatment 
of this issue in the memorandum, and will shortly circulate a 
brief addition to it that will opine that these practices, like 
"double bunking", do not constitute punishment. 
There is no suggestion below or by respondents that these 
restrictions were employed by MCC officials with an intent to 
punish the pretrial detainees. Absent a showing of such intent, 
the test is, I believe, as stated in Part Im of my memorandum, -----whether the restriction is "reasonably related to a legitimate 
governmental objective. 11 Insuring the security of the institution 
is a legitimate governmental goal, whether the institution houses 
pretrial detainees, sentenced inmates, or both. And in my view, 
all of the restrictions struck down by the Court of Appeals and 
challenged here by the government were reasonable responses to 
legitimate security concerns on the part of MCC officials. 
As to the question of how 11 punishment 11 is to be defined, 
other than making the principal criterion intent and saving, as 
- 3 -
my memorandum does, drastic examples such as dungeons and shackles, 
I do not think any other more subjective test can be reconciled 
with our decided cases. As Potter suggests in his circulation 
of March 7th, those cases hold in one instance that the voting 
in a foreign election by a United States citizen may be consti-
tutionally used by Congress as a basis for revoking his citizenship, 
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), but that Congress has no 
similar authority to divest the citizenship of one who departs 
or remains outside of the jurisdiction of the United States in 
time of war or national emergency for the purpose of evading or 
avoiding training in service. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 
U.S. 144 (1963). The analysis of the court in the latter case, 
which I have described in my printed memorandum in this case, 
turned on the conclusion that the revocation of citizenship for 
evading service was imposed by congress with intent to punish, 
and Perez was distinguished as involving a statute providing for 
"loss of citizenship for noncriminal behavior instead of as an 
additional sanction attaching to behavior already a crime, and 
congressional expression attending [its] passage lacked the over-
whelming indications of punitive purpose which characterize the 
enactments here." 372 U.S. 144, 170, fn. 30. Since the objective 
consequences -- loss of citizenship -- are identical in each of 
the two cases, intent must as a general matter be regarded as 
.. 
- 4 -
a crucial element in determining what constitutes "punishment.'' 
Admittedly detention is traditionally employed in many cases in 
order to punish, but the plaintiffs do not even challenge the 
government's right to detain for the short periods involved in 
this case. 
Sincerely/ 
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SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Eric 
DATE: 3-9-79 
RE: Bell v. Wolfish, No. 77-1829 
I have now managed to get through WHR's tome in this 
case as well as the responding memoranda. In general, WHR's 
analysis seems consistent with your vote at conference: The 
restrictions imposed on pretrial detainees are impermissible if 
they constitute punishment, which is defined largely in terms of 
1yz-
the intent behind the particular restriction. Absent an intent 
to punish, a detainee may be subject to such rules and conditions 
as are reasonably related to the government's legitimate 
interests in his confinement and the necessities of jail 
administration. 
Unsurprisingly, WHR has applied this test in a manner 
that reverses the court of appeals outright. Although you voted 
to reverse in most respects, you felt that certain of the MCC 
practices were unreasonable unless modified at least to some 
extent. In particular, you believed that body cavity searches --... 
must be founded upon a reasonable suspicion, and that the near-
total ban on packages was unwarranted. (You were willing to 
reverse on the receipt-of-books rule, but only as it was modified 
by the prison after this case was litigated in the lower courts.) 
Unless I have missed something objectionable in WHR's 
memorandum, I think you could join his opinion except with 
respect to the two points mentioned above. As to these, a brief 
concurrence stating that your analysis of the reasonableness test 
yields a different result would not be difficult to write. 
PS's memorandum in support of WHR's position seems 
\ basically correct to me. WJB also has circulated a memorandum, 
which I am quite sure you will not want to join: To the extent 
he thinks the challenged MCC practices "harm" inmates, I think he 
is far wide of the mark, with the possible exception of the ----------------
•cavity search problem; further, saying that punishment is a 
"question of law" does not, as WJB seems to suggest, mean that 
considerable deference to prison officials on what constitutes 
2. 
"reasonableness" is unwarranted. JPS's "invasion of dignity" 
approach to the problem seems unacceptable to me; it is 
hopelessly subjective and promises only deep ning federal-court 
involvement in the administration of prisons. 
3. 
Bill: 
,""· ... Those of us who are "tapped" to write 
know from experience that we commence without a 
constituency,:? n~ this certainly was your situation in 
case. ~ ~ · 
,:.,,,If,,, 
I have now read your memorandum with some 
and can join ,, Parts I and II quite happily. 
As to the other four comparatively minor issues, 
you and I took a different view at the Conference with 
respect to the "body cavity searches" and the near total ban 
on packages. ~I continue to think that a cavity search is 
unreasonable in the abs~nce of some reasonable gr.ound for 
suspicion, and I would think that there has been no adequate 
showinq why packages could not be examined without an undue 
burden on the prison authorities. The present package rule 
seems unduly restrictive. In sum, I can join all of your 
opinion except with respect to the cavity search and the 
package restriction, as to which I inclined to writ~ 
. along the foregoing lines. ~ 
; 
~-
t ·' .. , •• 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.;§tqtrttttt <lfonr± tr! tltt :Jlnitth' ,jhtltg 
J1J ag trmsfon.. ~. ar. 2n,;i.1!-J 
March 15, 1979 
Re: No. 77-1829 - Bell v. Wolfish 
Dear Bill, 
I am in essential agreement with your 
memorandum. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 





C HAM!tE R S OF' 
THE CHIEF JUSTIC E 
.iu.prmu <!fltlttt of tqt :Littb ~ncn·1, 
~as1yinghtn. ~- C!J. 20,5-'!,3 
March 29, 1979 
Dear Bill: 
Re: 77-1829 Bell v. Wolfish 
I am in general agreement with your memorandum. -faf~I 
My reservation is as to the relative ease of substituting 
segregation of visitors' to make it impossible to hand A 
deliver drugs, etc. This is S.O.P. in many institutions. 
However, I am not sure our personal preferences in how 
prisons should be run should prevail. 
I'll be interested in what is written on this 
score. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
1r, • • 
CHAMBERS Of" 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
..§u:prtnu C!fomi c-f tltt 'Jlittittb ;§htlts 
~a.nlybtgfc-n. ~. QJ. 20.;,'l-$ 
Re: No. 77-1829 - Bell v. Wolfish 
Dear Bill: 
April 2, 1979 
I am in general agreement with your memorandum as 
recirculated. My only reservation has to do with the visual 
body cavity search. I really could go either way on this aspect 
of the case. Facial validity, however, is the issue before us, 
and I am content with your conclusion that this is not facially 
invalid. 
I add my thanks, to those of the others, for your taking 
on a nonconstituency assignment such a_s this. 
Sincerely, 
'--------
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
;iuprtnu (!tintrl of tlrt '!fnitth- ~huts 
Jh:ts~an. ~. (!t. 2!lffeJl.~ 
April 5, 1979 
Re: No. 77-1829 - Bell v. Wolfish 
Dear Bill, 
I am still with you. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 












JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
j,np-rtm.t <!fltttrl cf ilf t ~b j,btltg 
~a,g lpngLnt. , . QJ. 2llffe'l-~ 
April 10, 1979 
Re: No. 77-1829, Be 11 v. Wolf i sh 
Dear Bi 11, 
I am glad to join your opinion for 
the Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 




.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.:§upri-tttt ~curl o-f iltt ~nitth- j;mus-
Jlrul~cn:. ~- ~- 20.;rJ!.~ 
Re: No. 77-1829 - Bell v. Wolfish 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your formal opinion. 
Sincerely, 
---
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
April 10, 1979 
" 
r 
. . , 
j;upt"tmt (!Jirnd of tqt ~h ;§itatts 
'JfrurfringtJtn. ,. <!f. 20ffe>t,~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
April 19, 1979 
Re: 77-1829 - Bell v. Wolfish 
Dear Bill: 
This is to confirm my early informal join. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 











TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Eric 
DATE: 4-21-79 
RE: TM's dissenting opinion in Bell v. Wolfish 
No. 77-1829 
TM's dissenting opinion in this case is unsurprising. He 
advocates heightened levels of judicial scrutiny of restrictions on 
pretrial detainees that, in my opinion, would deeply and unwisely 
enmesh the Court in jail administration. I therefore do not 
recommend that you join. 
2. 
TM does have a point that WHR's analysis is exceptionally 
deferential, however. The last time we talked about this case, you 
were inclined to write a brief concurrence disagreeing with WHR's 
result on the packages restriction and the body cavity search. I 
don't feel particularly strongly about the former, but I would 
recommend that you cast your vote in favor of requiring at least some 
level of cause, probably "reasonable suspicion," to justify the anal 
and genital searches. WHR apparently has his five votes, so your 
vote will not affect the holding of the Court. 
1st DRAFr 
To 10 Chief Just1oe 
r . hh., t Ice Brennaa 
Mr h 1s :;ice Stewart 
~r Yu-"' r.1 (1e fhi te 
lfr .Ju~t \ce Marshall 
Mr Tuattce 13laokmun 
Mr . Just1 ce Rehnquist. 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: Hr. Justice Powell 
2 3 ~PR 1979 
Circulated: ______ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITiifsrfl~: 
No. 77-1829 
Griffin B. Bell et al., Petitioners) On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v. United States Court of 
L 
. W lfi h 
1 
Appeals for the Second 
oms O S et a . c· 't lfCUl . 
[April -, 1979] 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
I join the opinion of the Court except the discussion and 
holding with respect to body cavity searches. In view of the 
serious intrusion on one's privacy occasioned by such a search, 
I think at least some level of cause, such as a reasonable 
suspicion, should be required to justify the anal and genital 




~ttprtlltt {Q:tturl ttf flrt ~J~h j;tah,9' 
~ru¥lp:tt¢lltt. ~- (Q:. ffe~, 
CHAMBE RS OF 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. Apri'l 27, 1979 
RE; No. 77-1829 Bell v. Wolfish 
Dear John: 
Will you please join me in your dissent. 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
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